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LAW, CAPITALISM, AND THE FUTURE
A. DEFINING THE ENTREPRENEUR:
WEBER'S PROTESTANT ETIDC REFINED
EDITOR'S NOTE: Departing from the usual style of a law review article, the
following manuscript not only invites but requires extensive participation by
the reader in analyzing the function of the law in relation to capitalism. The
author adopts an unorthodox technique and weaves together seemingly un-
related ideas. For example. by interjecting a lengthy quote from a 1964 Supreme
Court decision, the author bids the reader to determine whether the law can
serve "as a successful control device" in the face of the increasing internationali-
zation of capitalism. Moreover, the web of ideas that the author spins does
not suggest facile distinctions or conclusions. From the confusing and complex
bombardment of ideas, analogies, and theories, the reader hopefully will dis-
cover perceptions worthy of the challenge.
I
The Inadequacies of Weber's Ideal Type
(i)
History is the story of what happened, and the most instructive explana-
tions - those most deserving of the historical title - are the ones that most
satisfactorily account for the presence of the phenomenon whose behavior is
being described. Historical explanations are therefore judged both in terms
of how well they explain given instances of a phenomenon and how many
such instances they explain.
Why Weber's explanation of entrepreneurship was so satisfactory is a
question for the social and intellectual histories of the times during which it
has been accepted. This article offers an explanation for the generally accepted
proposition that Weber's theory explains remarkably few of the known
instances of entrepreneurship. This defect in Weber's theory was caused both
by the methodological inadequacies of the technique of the ideal type, which
focuses on logical extremes as opposed to concrete cases, and by a dis-
proportionate stress on rationality as a crucial component of the economic
phenomenon of capitalism.
Weber, a German sociologist writing in the nineteenth century, was con-
cerned with the relationship between the Protestant ethic and capitalist spirit.
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The following excerpts from his work provide the nucleus for that part of
his theory that is relevant to this article.
(ii)
If any inner relationship between certain expressions of the old
Protestant spirit and modern capitalistic culture is to be found, we must
attempt to find it, for better or worse, not in its alleged more or less
materialistic or at least anti-ascetic joy of living, but in its purely
religious characteristics. l\{ontesquieu says (Esprit de Lois, Book XX,
chap. 7) of the English that they "had progressed the farthest of all
peoples of the world in three important things: in piety, in commerce,
and in freedom." Is it not possible that their commercial superiority and
their adaptation to free political institutions are connected in some way
with that record of piety which Montesquieu ascribes to them?l
The decisive point was ... the conception of the state of religious
grace, common to all the denominations, as a status which marks off
its possessor from the degradation of the flesh, from the world.
[T]hough the means by which it was attained differed for different
doctrines, it could not be guaranteed by any magical sacraments, by
relief in the confession, nor by individual good works. That was only
possible by proof of a specific type of conduct unmistakably different
from the way of life of the natural man. From that followed for the
individual an incentive methodically to supervise his own state of
grace in his own conduct, and thus to penetrate it with asceticism.
But ... this ascetic conduct meant a rational planning of the whole
of one's life in accordance with God's wiII. And this asceticism was
no longer an opus supererogationis, but something which could be re-
quired of everyone who would be certain of salvation. The religious
life of the saints, as distinguished from the natural life, was - the
most important point -- no longer lived outside the world in monastic
communities, but within the world and its institutions. This rationaliza-
tion of conduct within this world, but for the sake of the world beyond,
was the consequence of the concept of calling of ascetic Protestantism.2
We can of course only proceed by presenting these religious ideas in
the artificial simplicity of ideal types, as they could at best but seldom
be found in history. For just because of the impossibility of drawing
sharp boundaries in historical reality we can only hope to under-
stand their specific importance from an investigation of them in their
most consistent and logical forms.3
"B.A. 1955, Yale University. M.A. 1963, Clare College, Cambridge; LL.B., Ph.D. 1962, Yale
University; Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 45 (T. Parsons transI.
1946) [hereinafter cited as WEBER].
2. ld. at 153-54 (footnote omitted).
3. ld. at 98. "(T]he types of moral conduct in which we are interested may be found
in a similar manner among the adherents of the most various denominations •... We
shall see that similar ethical maxims may be correlated with very different dogmatic
foundations. Also the important literary tools for the saving of souls, above all the
casuistic compendia of the various denominations, influenced each other in the course of
time; one finds great similarities in them, in spite of very great differences in actual conduct.
"It would almost seem as though we had best completely ignore both the dogmatic
foundations and the ethical theory and confine our attention to the moral practice so far
as it can be determined. That, however, is not true. The various different dogmatic roots
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The rationalization of the world, the elimination of magic as a
means to salvation, the Catholics had not carried nearly so far as the
Puritans (and before them the Jews) had done. To the Catholic the
absolution of his Church was a compensation for his own imperfection.
The priest was a magician who performed the miracle of transub-
stantiation, and who held the key to eternal life in his hand. One
could turn to him in grief and penitence. He dispensed atonement,
hope of grace, certainty of forgiveness, and thereby granted release
from that tremendous tension to which the Calvinist was doomed by
an inexorable fate, admitting of no mitigation. For him such friendly
and human comforts did not exist. He could not hope to atone for
hours of weakness or of thoughtlessness by increased good will at other
times, as the Catholic or even the Lutheran could. The God of
Calvanism demanded of his believers not single good works, but a life
of good works combined into a unified system. There was no place for
the very human Catholic cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, release,
followed by renewed sin. Nor was there any balance of merit for a
life as a whole which could be adjusted by temporal punishments or
the Churches' means of grace.4
The combination of faith in absolutely valid norms with absolute
determinism and the complete transcendentality of God was in its
way a ~roduct of great genius. At the same time it was, in principle,
very much more modern than the milder doctrine, making greater
concessions to the feelings which subjected God to the moral law. Above
all, we shall see again and again how fundamental is the idea of proof
for our problem. Since its practical significance as a psychological
basis for rational morality could be studied in such purity i~ the doctrine
of predestination, it was best to start there with the doctrine in its
most consistent form.5
That great historic process in the development of religions, the
elimination of magic from the world which had begun with the old
Hebrew prophets and, in conjunction with Hellenistic scientific thought,
had repudiated all magical means' to salvation as superstition and sin,
came here to its logical conclusion. . . .
Combined 'with the harsh doctrines of the absolute transcendentality
of God and the corruption of everything pertaining to the flesh, this
inner isolation of the individual contains, on the one hand, the reason
for the entirely negative attitude of Puritanism to all the sensuous and
emotional elements in culture and in religion, because they are of no use
toward salvation and promote sentimental illusions and idolatrous
superstitions. Thus it provides a basis for a fundamental antagonism
to sensuous culture of all kinds. On the other hand, it forms one of
the roots of that disillusioned and pessimistically inclined in-
dividualism which can even to-day be identified in the national
characters and the institutions of the peoples with a Puritan past, in
of ascetic morality did no doubt die out after terrible struggles. But the original connection
with those dogmas has left behind important traces in the later undogmatic ethics; moreover,
only the knowledge of the original body of ideas can help us to understand the connection
of that morality with the idea of the after-life which absolutely dominated the most
spiritual men of that time. Without its power, overshadowing everything else, no. moral
awakening which seriously influenced practical life came into being in that period:'
Id. at 96-97.
4. Id. at 117 (footnotes omitted).
5. Id. at 126.
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such a striking contrast to the quite different spectacles through which
the enlightenment later looked upon men.6
We may imagine [the] routine [of the continental textile industry]
somewhat as follows: The peasants came with their cloth, often (in
the case of linen) principally or entirely made from raw material which
the peasant himself had produced, to the town in which the putter-
out lived, and after a careful, often official, appraisal of the quality,
received the customary price for it. The putter-out's customers, for
markets any appreciable distance away, were middlemen, who also came
to him, generally not yet following samples, but seeking traditional
qualities, and bought from his warehouse, or long before delivery,
placed orders which were probably in turn passed on to the peasants.
Personal canvassing of customers took place, if at all, only at long in-
tervals. Otherwise correspondence sufficed, though the sending of
samples slowly gained ground. The number of business hours was very
moderate, perhaps five to six a day, sometimes considerably less: in the
rush season, where there was one, more. Earnings were moderate;
enough to lead a respectable life and in good times to put away a little.
On the whole, relations among competitors were relatively good, with
a large degree of agreement on the fundamentals of business. A long
daily visit to the tavern, with often plenty to drink, and a congenial
circle of friends, made life comfortable and leisurely.
The form of organization was in every respect capitalistic; the
entrepreneur's activity was of a purely business character; the use of
capital, turned over in the business, was indispensable; and finally,
the objective of the economic process, the book-keeping, was rational.
But it was traditionalistic business. if one considers the spirit which
animated the entrepreneur: the traditional manner of life, the
traditional rate of profit, the traditional amount of work, the traditional
manner of regulating the relationships with labour, and the essentially
traditional circle of customers and the manner of attracting new ones.
All these dominated the conduct of the business, were at the basis,
one may say, of the ethos of this group of business men.
Now at some time this leisureliness was suddenly destroyed, and
often entirely without any essential change in the form of organization,
such as the transition to a unified factory, to mechanical weaving, etc.
What happened was, on the contrary, often no more than this: some
young man from one of the putting-out families went out into the
country, carefully chose weavers for his employ, greatly increased the
rigour of his supervision of their work, and thus turned them from
peasants into labourers. On the other hand, he would begin to change
his marketing methods by so far as possible going directly to the
final consumer, would take the details into his own hands, would
personally solicit customers, visiting them every year, and above all
would adapt the quality of the product directly to their needs and
wishes. At the same time he began to introduce the principle of low
prices and large turnover. There was repeated what everywhere and
always is the result of such a process of rationalization: those who
would not follow suit had to go out of business. The idyllic state
collapsed under the pressure of a bitter competitive struggle, respectable
fortunes were made, and not lent out at interest, but always reinvested
in the business. The old leisurely and comfortable attitude toward life
gave way to a hard frugality in which some participated and came
to the top, because they did not wish to consume but to earn, while
6. ld. at 105-06 (footnotes omitted).
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others who wished to keep on with the old ways were forced to curtail
their consumption.
And, what is most important in this connection, it was not generally
in such cases a stream of new money invested in the industry which
brought about this revolution - in several cases known to me the whole
revolutionary process was set in motion with a few thousands of capital
borrowed from relations - but the new spirit, the spirit of modem
capitalism, had set to work. The question of the motive forces in the
expansion of modern capitalism is not in the first instance a question
of the origin of the capital sums which were available for capitalistic
uses, but, above all, of the development of the spirit of capitalism.
Where it appears and is able to work itself out, it produces its own
capital and monetary supplies as the means to its ends, but the reverse
is not true. Its entry on the scene was not generally peaceful. A Hood
of mistrust, sometimes of hatred, above all of moral indignation,
regularly opposed itself to the first innovator. Often - I know of
several cases of this sort - regular legends of mysterious shady spots
in his previous life have been produced. It is very easy not to recognize
that only an unusually strong character could save an entrepreneur
of this new type from the loss of his temperate self-control and from
both moral and economic shipwreck. Furthermore, along with clarity
of vision and ability to act, it is only by virtue of very definite and
highly developed ethical qualities that it has been possible for him
to command the absolutely indispensable confidence of his customers
and workmen. Nothing else could have given him the strength to
overcome the innumerable obstacles, above all the infinitely more
intensive work which is demanded of the modern entrepreneur. But
these are ethical qualities of quite a different sort from those adapted
to the traditionalism of the past."
One feels at once that this powerful expression of the Puritan's
serious attention to this world, his acceptance of his life in the world
as a task, could not possibly have come from the pen of a medieval
writer.... It is now our task to replace this vague feeling by a some-
what more precise logical formulation, and to investigate the funda-
mental basis of these differences. The appeal to national character,
is generally a mere confession of ignorance....8
It might thus seem that the development of the spirit of capitalism
is best understood as part of the development of rationalism as a
7. Id. at 66·69 (footnotes omitted). "As he became increasingly involved in the affairs
of the world, [Luther] came to value work in the world more highly. But in the concrete
caIling an individual pursued he saw more and more a special command of God to fulfill
these particular duties which the Divine Will had imposed upon him. And after the
conflict with the Fanatics and the peasant disturbances, the objective historical order of
things in which the individual has been placed by God becomes for Luther more and
more a direct manifestation of divine will. The stronger and stronger emphasis on the
providential element, even in, particular events of life, led more and more to a traditionalistic
interpretation based on the idea of Providence. The individual should remain once and
for all in the station and calling in which God had placed him, and should restrain his
worldly activity within the limits imposed by his established station in life. While his
economic traditionalism was orignally the result of Pauline indifference, it later became
that of a more and more intense belief in divine providence which identified absolute
obedience to God's will, with absolute acceptance of things as they were. Starting from
this background, it was impossible for Luther to establish a new or in any way fundamental
connection between worldly activity and religious principles." Id. at 84·85 (footnotes omitted).
8. Id. at 88.
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whole, and could be deduced from the fundamental position of
rationalism on the basic problems of life. In the process Protestantism
would only have to be considered in so far as it had formed a stage
prior to the development of a purely rationalistic philosophy. But any
serious attempt to carry this thesis through makes it evident that such
a simple way of putting the question will not work.... [I]f under
practical rationalism is understood the type of attitude which sees and
judges the world consciously in terms of the worldly interests of the
individual ego, then this view of life was and is the special peculiarity
of the peoples of the liberum arbitrium, such as the Italians and the
French are in very flesh and blood.9
(iii)
What this article proposes is that a more useful definition of the
entrepreneur than that embodied in Weber's theory would focus on the
opposition to what Weber designates as traditionalism.1O Thus, if society is
defined as the group recognized as rightfully occupying any area, peer as
an acknowledged member of the group, and convention as a rule applicable
to peer group behavior, the entrepreneur is an individual who breaks social
conventions within acceptable limits. To illustrate the fact that this
definition of entrepreneurship is technically applicable to all areas of human
endeavor, the following description of Christopher Columbus is offered as
one that exemplifies the spirit of entrepreneurship.
Most sensible people admitted that a voyage west to China could
be made, and a few said it should be done, but nobody cared to try,
until that young Genoese Cristoforo Colombo began pestering people
to finance his project.
Exactly when and how he got the idea we do not know. It may have
been put to him, as we suggest, by a shipmaster impatient of the
dangers and disappointments of the Guinea trade. It may have come
to him in a rush of religious emotion at Mass, when he heard Psalm
19, "The Heavens declare the Glory of God;" for a Genoa compatriot
remarked that Christopher fulfilled the prophecy of the fourth verse,
"And their words unto the ends of the world." He may have heard that
prophecy of Seneca in t.he Medea, "A time will come when the chains
of the Ocean will fall apart, and a vast continent be revealed; when
a pilot will discover new worlds and Thule no longer be the ultimate."
That prophecy, too, was fulfilled by him, as his son Ferdinand duly
noted in his copy of Seneca. We do not know how Columbus came by
the idea of sailing west to reach the East, but once he had it, that was
the truth for him; he was the sort of man in whom action is the comple-
ment of a dream. He knew the truth, but he could not rest until it was
proved, until the word became flesh. And, let us admit, his combination
of creative imagination with obstinate assurance, his impatience with
all who were slow to be convinced and contempt for those who with-
stood him, made Columbus a fool in the eyes of some men and a bore
to most. Like the pioneers of aviation, he was considered a little touched
in the head: one who would fly in the face of God. And the worst of
it was that he had to persuade stupid people in high places that his
9. Id. at 76-77.
10. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
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Enterprise of the Indies, as he called it, was plausible, because he
wanted money, men and equipment to carry it outP
It is probable that Columbus [on his return from his first journey]
could have had anything he wanted - a title, castle in Spain, a pension
for life and an endowment - and it would have been well for him
had he then taken profits and retired with honor, leaving to others the
responsibility of colonizing. But he was not that kind of man, and if
he had been, he would not have discovered America. He must see that
the islands he discovered were settled, the gold trade put on a proper
footing and the natives converted; he must make contact with the Grand
Khan, or some Oriental potentate greater than Guacanagari. The
rights already granted to him, incident to his offices of Admiral and
Viceroy, promised (in his eyes) to be far more lucrative than any estate
in Spain could possibly be. More than that, he was in good health, full
of energy, in the prime of life (aged forty-one), and he regarded the
work that God had appointed him to do as just begun.12
(iv)
The original Protestant vision was of a society of religiously en-
lightened laymen who were no longer burdened by traditional religious
superstation and tyranny. That vision was still bright in major con-
solidation tracts of the 1530s and 1540s.... It can certainly be argued
that Protestant catechisms and church ordinances, where fully en-
forced, tended finally to secure religious freedom by ending it. None-
theless, these same consolidation tracts of the Reformation challenge
influential modern assessments of the Protestant movement. Even in
these tracts the new work ethic does not appear as an answer to
religious anxiety, and still less as a sanction of compulsive labor and
thrift. If such traits are Protestant, as scholarship in the tradition of
Max Weber has argued, then they are born of a still later Protestantism.
The work ethic of first generation Protestants remained what it was
at the Reformation's inception: an insistence that people, especially
the clergy and the powerful institutions they represented, be useful
11. S. MORISON, CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS, MARINER 14-15 (1955).
12. Id. at 63-64. "[Columbus1 share of the gold obtained on the Fourth Voyage was
considerable ••• [b]ut Columbus felt that he had been defrauded, and monotonously
besought his son to obtain confirmation of what he called his ••• 'thirds.' ••• The 'third'
was really a preposterous claim. Columbus' grant of the new office of Admiral of the
Ocean Sea stated that it carried 'pre-eminences and prerogatives • • • in the same manner
as ••• the Grand Admiral of Castile.' Having ascertained that the Grand Admiral collected
a thirty-three and one-third per cent tax on overseas trade within his jurisdiction - between
Spain and the Canary Islands - Columbus claimed it as his due for the entire inward and
outward trade of the Indies. Obviously, if that had been admitted, there would have been
little profit left in American trade for anyone else, and he and his descendants would
have become wealthier than the King of Spain or any other prince. As it was, even by
collecting a mere two per cent of the gold, :pe was a rich man according to the standards
of, the day, and left substantial amounts to his sons.
"It should be said that Columbus never intended to keep all this money. Even on his
deathbed he was planning to accumulate a fund to finance a new crusade, and so provided
in his last will and testament. It was always on his mind that the profits of his 'Other
World' might be used to recover the Holy Sepulchre from the infidel. And he was much
more hurt over the slights to his dignity and honor than by the denial of what he deemed
to be his property rights:' Id. at 145-46.
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servants within and not burdens upon their communities. That aim was
the point of the struggle ... and ... the inspiration behind the new
social ethic extrapolated from the priesthood of all believers. '3
II
The Functional Advantages of Legal Case Studies
(i)
A basis for historical explanation can be ascertained through reference
to a legal opinion deciding a concrete legal controversy, as well as through
reference to an ideal type, such as that found in Weber's theory. The ad-
vantages possessed by the legal opinion over the ideal type in providing a
basis for historical explanation can be summarized in terms of the factors of
complexity and time. The ideal type may either overlook or weigh dis-
proportionately one of the myriad of factors that constitute the phenomenon
it is intended to describe.'4 The nature and proportionate weight of those
factors may also vary over time.'s The technique the common law has evolved
13. S. OZMENT, THE REFORMATION IN THE CITIES: THE ApPEAL OF PROTESTANTISM TO
SIXTEENTH-CENTURY GERMANY AND SWITZERLAND 164 (1975).
14. "We have continually to deal with aspects of the Reformation which must appear
to the truly religious consciousness as incidental and even superficial. For we are merely
attempting to clarify the part which religious forces have played in forming the developing
web of our specifically worldly modern culture, in the complex interaction of innumerable
different historical factors." WF.BER at 90.
15. "[Weber's] pluralistic agnosticism, manifested in his refusal to pledge allegiance
to any exclusive viewpoint lest it do injustice to the unique individuality of historical
entities and the perpetual shift of cultural horizons, was laudable in intention. It seemed
to be pointing the way to the functionalization of research and interpretation in the
social sciences. Actually, however, Weber's isolative treatment led to inevitable distortions.
His method entailed the breakdown of any complex phenomenon into its components and
then, choosing each one seriatim as a constant, tracing its effects on the other variables.
At the end of the process, he indicated there would have to be a return to assess the
varying force of each component in the actual historical composite and to determine how
closely the empirical phenomena approached the ideal types he had formulated. This
he had planned to do for his problem of the relationship between the Protestant ethic
and the spirit of capitalism, but he must have felt the infinite and impossible nature of
the task. Moreover, his approach offers no method for determining the interrelation of
factors, the degree of influence pertaining to each, or their temporal variations, thereby
leaving room for the play of personal evaluation in the choice and characterization of the
particular historical atoms.
"For the historian concerned with determining the causes of a particular historical
datum, the problem of timing, historical phenomena and tracing temporal variations is
one of the crucial difficulties arising out of the impossibility, inherent in Weber's method,
of determining the degree of influence to be assigned to the various factors involved.
The ideal-type method neglects the time coefficient, or at any rait impairs the possibility
of establishing time sequences, because it involves a telescoping of data. Granted, for
instance, that Weber's interpretation of Calvinist theology is correct and that it was the
type that would result in activism, dynamism, industry, and so on, the question still remains
whether ,these influences did not begin to exert a significant effect only after capitalism
had already reached a dominant position:' Fisholl', The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism: The History of a Controversy, in THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND MODERNIZATION:
A COMPARATIVE VIEW 79-80 (5. Eisenstadt ed. 1968).
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to deal with these possibilities is that of precedent: what a given opinion
means, beyond the specific decision it embodies, is a consequence of whether
and how it is cited. The questions, in other words, are whether the precedent
will survive over time, in that it continues to be cited, and the extent to which
the nature and form of the cita,tions indicate adaptation of the precedent to
changing social and econo;mic conditions.
The remainder of this section attempts to analyze an opinion by
Benjamin N. Cardozo. That opinion, Meinhard v. Salmon,16 is striking in
that Cardozo's holding exhibits the identical defect as Weber's ideal type.
Both Cardozo's theory and Weber's ideal type identify morality - the in-
ternalized standards that characterize capitalistic society - with the calm and
objective rationality of the numbers whose increasing magnitude socially de-
fined the successful capitalist;17 thus, both place a disproportionate emphasis
on the possession and manipulation of capital as opposed to other skills and
attributes required by a capitalistic society.
(ii)
Salmon, while in course of treaty with [a] lessor as to the execution
of the lease, was in course of treaty with Meinhard ..• for the necessary
funds.18
When the lease was near its end, Elbridge T. Gerry had become
the owner of the reversion . . . owned much other property in the
neighborhood . • • had a plan to lease the entire tract • • . destroy
the buildings then existing and put up another in their place. . . .
Submitted such a project to several capitalists and dealers . . . was
unable to carry it through with any of them ... approached ... Sal-
mon ... [and entered] a new lease [with] the Midpoint Realty Company,
which is owned and controlled by Salmon, a lease covering the whole
tract, and involving a huge outlay.19
The lease between Gerry and the Midpoint Realty Company was
signed ..• on January 25, 1922 •.. Meinhard was not informed....
The first that he knew of it was in February when . . . [he] made
demand .•• that the lease be held in trust as an asset of the venture.20
16. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
17. "[T]he capitalistic adventurer has existed everywhere. With the exception of trade
and credit and banking transactions, [his] activities were predominantly of an irrational
and speculative character, or directed to acquisition by force, above all the acquisition of
booty, whether directly in war or in the form of continuous fiscal booty by exploitation of
subjects.
"But in modem times the Occident has developed, in addition to this, a very different
form of capitalism which has appeared nowhere else: the rational capitalistic organization
of (formally) free labour.
"Now the peculiar modem 'Western form of capitalism has been, at first sight, strongly
influenced by the development of technical possibilities. Its rationality is to·day essentially
dependent on the calculability of the most important technical factors. But this means
fundamentally that it is dependent on the peculiarities of modem science, especially the
natural sciences based on mathematics and exact and rational experiment." WEBER at
20,21,24. .
18. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 461, 462,164 N.E. 545. 546 (1928).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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The legal premise on which Cardozo's holding in favor of Meinhard was
based characterized the agreement between Salmon and Meinhard involving
the original lease as:
[A] joint venture with terms embodied in a writing.21
The two were coadventurers, subject to fiduciary duties akin to
those of partners.22
We have no thought to hold that Salmon was guilty of a conscious
purpose to defraud. Very likely he assumed in all good faith that with
the approaching end of the venture he might ... take the extension
for himself.23 He had given to the enterprise time and labor as well
as money. He had made it a success. Meinhard, who had given money,
but neither time nor labor,24 had already been richly paid.25
The opinion notes that:
There might seem to be something grasping in [Meinhard's] insistence
21. Id. "Q. Did you read the contract?
"A. Just about ... Mr. Salmon said to me that he felt that we ought to have some
paper in case either one of us died, that the other one would not be embarrassed, and
he suggested drawing up a paper, which he had the man which I think he had this office
with, Mr. Everett, draw up, simply as a memorandum that if anything happened to either
one of us, stating if we both lived it should not be the contract at all, and that was the history
of that paper which I signed...." Record at 274 (M. Meinhard on cross-examination).
22. 249 N.Y. at 462, 164 N.E. at 546. Contrast this with the dissenting opinion:
"There was no general partnership, merely a joint venture for a limited object, to and
at a fixed time. The new lease, covering additional property, containing many new and
unusual terms and conditions, with a possible duration of eighty years, was more nearly
the purchase of the reversion than the ordinary renewal with which the authorities are
concerned." [d. at 473, 164 N.E. at 550 (Andrews, J. dissenting).
23. "What Mr. Salmon obtained was not a graft springing from the [original] lease
but something distinct and dilferent • . . . I think . . . that in the absence of some
fraudulent or unfair act the secret purchase of the reversion even by one partner is
rightful. Substantially this is such a purchase. Because of the mere label of a transaction
we do not place it on one side of the line or the other. Here is involved the possession of
a large and most valuable unit of property for eighty years, the destruction of all existing
structures and the erection of a new and expensive building covering the whole. No
fraud, no deceit, no calculated secrecy is found. Simply that the arrangement was made
without the knowledge of Mr. Meinhard. I think this not enough." Id. at 467-68, 164
N.E. at 548.
24. Id.
MORTON H. MEINHARD & CO.
66 to 72 Leonard St.
New York, Feb. 18, 1905
Mr. Walter J. Solomon
500 Fifth Ave., City
My dear Walter:
Your letter of the 16th inst. received and carefully noted and in reference to the
write off would say that same might be a technical term used in the real estate
business, and such being the case, it is quite beyond my comprehension.
Record at 1614 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 33).
25. 249 N.Y. at 467-68,164 N.E. at 548.
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upon more....26 [S]uch recriminations ... are not without their
force if conduct is to be judged by the common standards of
competitors.21
The basis for the holding, however, is that:
The heavier weight of duty rested . . . upon Salmon. He was a
coadventurer with Meinhard, but he was manager as wel1.28
A managing coadventurer appropriating the benefit of ... a lease
without warning to his partner might fairly expect to be reproached
with conduct that was underhand, or lacking to say the least, in
reasonable candor, if the partner were to surprise him in the act of
signing [aJ new instrument. Conduct subject to that reproach does not
receive from equity a healing benediction.29
Cardozo's test for determining the breach of a fiduciary duty consists of
ascertaining fairness of the expectation of reproach" if the fiduciary is
surprised in the act of signing the operative document. The anachronistic
nature of the test resides less in its phraseology in terms of the legal category
of partnership than in its easy avoidance by the corporate organizations whose
activities courts attempt to supervise precisely in terms of the legal concept
of fiduciary duties. The fact that Salmon v. Meinhard continues to be cited
for the proposition that corporate activities are subject to fiduciary principles
thus indicates one advantage possessed by case studies as opposed to ideal types.
III
Romney and the Rambler: A Case Study in Entrepreneurship
(i)
In the field of its" highest development "in the United States, the
pursuit of wealth, stripped of its religious and ethical meaning, tends
to become associated "with purely mundane passions, which often actually
give it the character of sport.30
The text leaves unclear why Weber in effect characterizes business in the
26. Id. at 468, 164 N.E. at 548.
27. "Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise con·
tinues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday
world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A
trustee is held to something stricter than the moraIs of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the
rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exception • • • •
Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court."
ld. at 463-64, 164 N.E. at 546.
28. Id. at 468, 164 N.E. at 548. See also note 24 supra.
29. 249 N.Y. at 468, 164 N.E. at 548.
": 30•. WEBER at 182, (footnote omitted).
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United States as lacking traits derived from Puritan origins rather than accepts
United States capitalism as a phenomenon that requires revision of his thesis
concerning the relationship between the Protestant ethic and the spirit
of capitalism.s1 The quoted passage is footnoted as follows:
115. "Couldn't the old man be satisfied with his $75,000 a year
and rest? Nol The frontage of the store must be widened to 400 feet.
Why? That beats everything, he says. In the evening when his wife
and daughter read together, he wants to go to bed. Sundays he looks
at the clock every five minutes to see when the day will be over - what
a futile lifeI" In these terms the son-in-law (who had emigrated from
Germany) of the leading dry-goods man of an Ohio city expressed his
judgment of the latter, a judgment which would undoubtedly have
seemed simply incomprehensible to the old man. A symptom of Ger-
man lac~ of energy.52
To understand the characteristics of the American capitalist, a case study
of three entrepreneurs, George Romney, Louis Wolfson, and Joseph Smith is
an appropriate beginning.
(ii)
George Wi1cken Romney, who became president of American Motors in
the mid-1950s was early distinguished as "the Creator of the Compact." In
his "Dinosaur in the Driveway" speech, made only four months after taking
command of American Motors, Romney criticized his competitors for creating
"gas guzzling monsters" - a message that Romney delivered to vast segments
of the American public.sS
At least part of [Romney's] effectiveness came from his air of religious
earnestness, which in turn derived directly from his background. A de-
vout Mormon (he still neither smokes, drinks nor swears, and he pays his
tithe regularly to the church), at age 19, he was sent to do missionary
work in Britain. There, for two years he sought Mormon converts by
earnest door-to-door solicitation and public meetings. This sober back-
ground was, however, soon melded with more worldly experience as a
U.S. senator's secretary (to Massachusetts Democrat David 1. Walsh),
31. See generally A. MITZMAN, THE IRON CAGE: AN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF
MAX WEBER (1970). "There wa!: a great difference which was very striking to contemporaries
between the moral standards of the courts of Refonned and of Lutheran princes, the latter
often being degraded by drunkenness and vulgarity. Moreover, the helplessness of the
Lutheran clergy, with their emphasis on faith alone, against the ascetic Baptist movement,
is well known. The typical Gennan quality often called good nature (Gemutlichkeit) or
naturalness contrasts strongly, even in the facial expressions of people, with the effects of that
thorough destruction of the spontaneily of the status naturalis in the Anglo-American
atmosphere, which Gennans are accustomed to jUdge unfavorably as narrowness, unfreeness,
and inner constraint. But the differences of conduct, which are very striking, have clearly
originated in the lesser degree of ascetic penetration of life in Lutheranism as distinguished
from Calvinism." WEBER at 127 (footnote omitted). See also text accompanying note 8 supra.
32. WEBER at 283. See note HI supra.
33. FORBES, Aug. I, 1961, at 15 (footnote omitted). In 1958, for instance, Romney
traveled 70,000 miles "carrying the compact gospel to any group that would listen." Id.
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a Washington lobbyist (for Alcoa) and a trade association head (of the
Automobile Manufacturers Association).
This lively mixture of political, business and missionary experience
was to serve Romney well. For just such a combination of politicking,
proselytizing and business was needed to save American Motors and
hasten the success of the compact car....
From 1954 through 1957, the first four years after the. merger (the-
company's fiscal ye.ar ends Sept. 30), American lost nearly $50 million.
And more ominous, working capital sank from ~82.6 million at the end
of fiscal 1954 to little more than half that figure three years later, despite
the most heroic measures of prevention.
American Motors turned the corner in tlle first quarter of its 1958
fiscal (ended Dec. 1957), when it chalked up a $4.9 million profit vs. a
$3-million loss in the same quarter the year before; and after that it
was Nelly-bar-the-door. For, partly as a result of Romney's relentless
hammering at the compact car theme, and even more- because of a
public reaction against the even higher-powered, higher-finned, more
chrome-splashed creations that continued to issue forth from the Big
Three, the Rambler suddenly began to move.34
On May 9, 1959, at the University of Michigan School of Business Ad-
ministration, George Romney concluded the Second Annual Business Leader-
s~p Lecture as follows:
Our economic system is still based on vesting ultimate power in the
hands of consumers. They make the decisions that result in economic
success, economic failure or economic mediocrity. Thus, our economic
system, like our political system, is of the people, by the people and
for the people. Consumers have been the chief beneficiaries of our
economic activity, and they are the bosses of that activity. Consequently,
since the system is fundamentally aimed at consumer benefit and
direction, I believe we should describe it as a system of "consumerism"
rather than "capitalism:' The continuation of "consumerism" is in
jeopardy as a result of excessive concentration of union and employer
power. However, this is a bigger story than the one you asked me to
discuss.
The Am,erican system is still basically consumeristic in that its pro-
ductive effort is directed at meeting the needs and desires of the con-
sumer, and in that the consumer in general exercises control over
industrial activity by his decisions in the marketplace. Both the owners
and workers in any enterprise depend for their profits, salaries and
wages on the favorable decisions of free customers. Thus the system is
fundamentally aimed at consumer benefit, and since all of us are con-
sumers, the direction of the system is ultimately vested in the greatest
good for the greatest number as determined by all of us.
The case history of Rambler is a story of consumerism. I believe
Rambler success at once proves the need and advantage of vigorous
competition between an adequate number of competitors in the auto-
mobile business, and of the need for primary recognition of the con-
sumer's role, and, that, finally, it will focus further attention on the
new status of the consumer, as a human being, as a citizen, as a force,
instead of as a mass statistic.35 _
34. Id.
35. Address by George W. Romney, Second Annual Business Leadership Lecture,
May 9, 1959, 11 MICH. Bus. REv. 7 (1959).
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From pre- and post-merger losses, AMC had in the mid-fifties a carry-
forward loss of $47 million. The tax benefits to be derived from such a situa-
tion attracted the investment in AMC of Louis "Wolfson, who in early 1957
became AMC's largest single shareholder. Both Wolfson and Romney were
reported to have been interested in using the available tax credits to facilitate
the organization of a group of appliance companies under Kelvinator.36
[Romney] met Wolfson [who headed a business empire which in-
cluded Merritt-Chapman & Scott, Devoe and Raynalds, a chain of
Florida theaters and other enterprises] for the first time on October
31, 1956, in Room 925 of the Ambassador Hotel (later Sheraton East)
in New York....
Wolfson explained he had bought more than 200,000 shares of
American Motors stock with the idea that the company be at least
partially liquidated.37
Wolfson questioned Romney sharply about the operating figures
for the fiscal year just ended [and] . . . was especially interested in
Kelvinator. Romney explained that while the company as a whole
had an operating loss of more than S30,000,000, Kelvinator had earned
$3,600,000 ... [and] launched into an earnest explanation of his
plans for American Motors.38
By the time the hour-and-a-half meeting ended, Romney and Wolfson
were calling each other "Lou" and "George." They found they had
something in common. Both had been school athletes, Wolfson an end
on the University of Georgia football team. Both were abstemious,
neither smoking nor drinking. Both were hard-working men of fierce
energy.
Wolfson promised to support Romney as long as he was co-
operative and emphasized that he wanted no information that Romney
would not give to other stockholders.39
Louis Wolfson, the brisk 42-year-old Florida financier . . . is
challenging dour 81-year-old Sewell Avery for control of the ~700
million mail order house of Montgomery Ward....40
Wolfson never moves in to take over a company until he has con-
ducted an intelligence operation involving months and sometimes
years of quiet painstaking investigations.41
The investigators first study the company's overhead costs, profit
figures, labor efficiency and the like against the average figures for
the industry. If the figures are out of line poor management is indicated,
and the Wolfsons begin to get interested. Production rate, product
quality, sales methods, manufacturing equipment and physical plant
are carefully studied. The Wolfson representatives even look for
executives living beyond their means, because they believe that a man
worried about his personal finances cannot devote adequate attention
to his company.42
36. BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 11, 1958, at 81-82.
37. T. MAHONEY, THE STORY OF GEORGE ROMNEY 29-30 (1960).
38. Id. at 30.
39. Id. at 31.
40. LIFE, Nov. 22, 1954, at 179.
41. Id. at 185.
42. Id.
HeinOnline -- 28 U. Fla. L. Rev. 323 1975-1976
1976] . LAW AND CAPITALISM 323
Wolfson's talent for inspiring loyalty is one of the main facets
of a basically very uncomplicated personality.... Said one [associate]
recently, "I would without questioning do anything that Lou Wolfson
asked me to do." .
There is justification for such confidence. Wolfson is familiar with
and can often recall down to the last dollar every significant figure
in his dozens of companies' reports. He can cite Dow Jones averages
on a second's notice. He has no constitutional need for sleep and
probably does not average six hours a night, a fact that troubles
colleagues not only for his welfare but for their own, since Wolfson
expects them to keep pace with him.43
His devotion to business is untempered by any apparent need for
relaxation, mental or physical. He has never smoked. He will sip a high-
ball rather than embarrass a hostess, but he has said he cannot under-
stand how anyone can enjoy the taste of liquor. He is no gambler,
although he likes a congenial poker game with friends.44
Wolfson's reputation for cutting up surpluses into rich dividends
may frighten some stockholders but should attract others not averse to
seeing the Ward dividend rate increase while the stock itself goes up.
Furthermore "\Volfson is planning a two months' tour this winter to
some 40 cities in which he plans to rent meeting rooms and explain
his plans to Ward stockholders. His boyish sincerity and softspoken
directness should make a formidable appeal.
To whatever Wolfson says in the next few months Wall Street will
listen both intently and suspiciously. The U.S. financial community
still has not made up its mind how to take Wolfson. Some of its more
conservative members refuse to discuss him publicly. Wolfson is not
merely a newcomer, he is a man of unconventional methods and
motives. Wall Street's reserve is intensified by the fact that never
before has so large and proper a body of stockholders as Montgomery
Ward's been subjected to so open and direct an onslaught.
Wolfson has attempted to define his motives with his usual frankness:
"I won't do anything for money for myself any more," he earnestly
remarked a few weeks ago. "Once making money was high on my list
of ambitions. I thank the Lord thaI: now it is 'way down on the list.
"\Vhen we first talked about Montgomery Ward, even people in my own
organization told me, 'It's too big. You're going in over your head.'
I like a challenge .like tha~. I've enjoyed proving to them it's not over
our head.
"Here's another thing. We have about 20,000 stockholders in our
companies now. If I can take in a company like Ward with 68,000
stockholders or so, and 70,000 employees - more than twice as many
as we have in our present companies - and put those stockholders'
money to work and show them how it is needed to create jobs, and if
I can restore the initiative and confidence of the employees in the
business that is their livelihood - well, if I can do that I will have
gone a long way to awaken corporate management generally to its
responsibilities and to reawaken confidence in American corporations.
That's my real ambition."
Such evangelistic piety is not likely to make Wall Street grow
misty-eyed. Wolfson will have to prove in much more tangible ways
that he has become what Wall Street considers a responsible member
of the business community. This he will probably try to do. And the
more he tries, the more he will serve to keep lazy or inefficient manage-
43. Id. at 191.
44. Id.
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ments alert - and to that extent, at least, he will be contributing to
the country's financial vigor.45
(iv)
It is true that Joseph Smith [an early :Mormon leader in the United
States] bucked cherished American traditions - the rigid separation
of church and state, the sanctity of private property, and the inviolability
of the marriage code. And it was his destruction of an opposition print-
ing press that precipitated his lynching. But it is also true that he was
purely a Yankee product and that a great deal that was good in
American folklore and thinking found its way into his writings and
into his church. The cornerstone of his metaphysics was that virile con-
cept which pervaded the whole American spirit and which was indeed
the noblest ideal of Jesus and Buddha, that man is capable of eternal
progress toward perfection.
But Joseph's conception of perfection was by no means exclusively
spiritual. His kingdom of God upon earth was saturated with the
Yankee enthusiasm for earthly blessings. No one more ingeniously
than he combined Jewish and Christian mysticism with the goal of
perpetual prosperity. "Adam fell that men might be," he wrote, "and
men are that they might have joy." And for Joseph Smith joy came,
not from melancholy contemplation, but from planning bIgger and
better cities, building bigger and nobler temples, and creating for himself
the nucleus of an American empire.
The source of his power lay not in his doctrine but in his person,
and the rare quality of his genius was due not to his reason but to his
imagination. He was a mythmaker of prodigious talent. And after a
hundred years the myths he created are still an energizing force in the
lives of a million followers. The moving power of Mormonism was
a fable - one that few converts stopped to question for its meaning
seemed profound and its inspiration was contagious.46
(v)
If what Weber designated "Protestant Ethic" may, in a historical sense
more precisely be linked with American national character, the question
presented is the way in which the emphasis on individualism characteristic
of United States political ideology is compatible with the social function
performed by what Weber defines as the essence of Protestant beliefY But
45. Id. at 194.
46. F. BRODIE, No MAN KNOWS My HISTORY: THE LIFE OF JOSEPH SMITH VIII-IX (19il).
"Basically Joseph's was not a revivalist sect. Although he followed some of the revivalist
patterns, he appealed as much to reason as to emotion, challenging his critics to examine
the evidences of his divine authority - the Book of Mormon, the lost books of Moses and
Enoch, the sworn statements of his witnesses, and numerous Bible-like re\'elations. The
importance of this appeal cannot be overestimated, for it drew into the Mormon ranks
many able men who had turned in disgust from the excesses of the local cults. The
intellectual appeal of Mormonism, which eventually became its greatest weakness as the
historical and 'scientific' aspects of Mormon dogma were cruelly disemboweled by
twentieth-century scholarship, was in the beginning its greatest strength:' Id. at 99. See
also text accompanying note 6 supra.
47. "It seems at first a m}Stery how the undoubted superiority of Calvinism in social
organization can be connected with this tendency to tear the individual away from the
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man's individualism is countered by another opposing instinctual pattern,
the desire to trust his fellow man. This conflict is explained by E. Weigert:
Before the child develops any thinking or verbal expression of his
emotions he is able to trust, since he experiences without consciousness
that his needs for survival, growth, and development fit into his
parents' needs to give gratification and protection in mutually adaptive,
tender cooperation. This trust, this confidence, which precedes all
}-ational thought processes, seems to me to be the matrix or an early
manifestation of religious experience." It grows with the growing in-
dividual and transcends the boundaries of the early environment; it
embraces the universe of the broadening personality. This propensity
to trust exists even when the parents are not trustworthy. In that case,
trust is driven underground, hiding behind defenses; but the propensity
to trust cannot be abolished in any human being.48
In moral and religious hyprocrisy we recognize the vestiges of a
yearning for peace and reconciliation with the ultimate power, the
ground of existence revealed in destiny. But the approach to this
ultimate authority is laden with the same excessive anxieties and dis-
trust as the helpless child experiences in the relation to powerful
parental authority which he does "not dare to trust. The excessively
anxious child tries to ward off nightmarish dangers by prayer or by
other propitiating or atoning gestures. He tries to win the powers of
goodness over onto his side in order to avoid desertion, punishment,
and the accompanying excessive anxieties. He tries to fight off the
black magic by a protective white magic. We recognize in the black
magic the hated punishing parent; while the protective, comforting
power represents the good, approving, and rewarding parent.49
- .
closed ties with which he is bound to this }vorld. But, however strange it may seem, it
follows from the peculiar form which the' Christian brotherly love was forced to take
under the pressure of the inner isolation of the individual through the Calvinistic
faith. • •. Brotherly love, since it may only be practised for the glory of God and not
in the service of the flesh, is expressed in the first place in the fulfilment of the daily
tasks given by the lex naturae: and in the process this fulfilment assumes a peculiarly ob-
jective and impersonal character, that of service in the interest of the rational organization
of our social environment." WEBER at 108-09 (footnotes omitted).
48. E. 'WEIGERT, THE CO\lRAGE To LOVE 7 (1970).
49. ld. at 18. "To a greater or lesser degree we are all easily deceived by our own
deceitful manipulations of authority. Nothing is more difficult than to be honest with
oneself. We are accustomed from childhood on to think in terms of good and bad, black
and white. It is important for our sense of prestige and security that we be on the good
side: therefore we try desperately to justify ourselves, sometimes by rationalizing argumenta-
tion. In such stubborn insistence on self-justification lie the roots of a paranoid development
with its ideas of grandiosity and persecution. We all become identified with the role that
we play. 'We really believe in our hypocritical goodness, our self-righteousness, even some-
times in our saintliness." ld. at 19.
"I said before that on any level of human development the blocked resources of trust
may spontaneously open up again. This is an experience totally beyond human efforts of
the intellect or of the will: it is an experience which the religious person humbly accepts
as the grace of God. Neither the psychoanalyst nor any other human being can produce
this redeeming experience, but the analyst may be able to contribute to the removal of
impediments of moral and religious self-deceit and hypocrisy, the outgrowth of an intolerant
conscience, an intransigent superego. I do not. consider deceit or hypocrisy primary needs:
they are a defense, like the claim for despotic power, or lust:' ld. at 20.
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But the emotional experience of wholeness is never static; the
synthetic function of the ego does not create a closed system. As long
as a person lives, he remains - although in varying degrees - open to
the future, open to the world as he sees it. The world of his experience,
his world and his ego, lives in continuous interchange. He shapes his
world, and in turn this world - his reality - shapes his ego. His
impulses, his potentialities, aiming into the future, are shaped by
processes of disintegration and reintegration, which Freud identified as
Thanatos and Eros. Freud's reduction of integrative and disintegrative
processes to basic instincts appears to some analysts, however, as an
oversimplifying hypothesis. Even Melanie Klein, who uses the term
"death instinct" amply, does not see in it a biological force but a sub-
jective experience - the elementary fear of death, the prototype of all
anxiety.50
Man seems to be in conflict between his trend toward individuation
and his need for solidarity with others. In human groups the motivation
to eliminate a rival in the hierarchy is not left to an instinctive releaser
automatism which dictates whether to kill or exercise mercy. Man uses
foresight which mobilizes anxiety or guilt feelings, and he anticipates
retaliation or punishment, which counteract and repress the murderous
impulse from awareness.51 ... Why is man's reasoning power so
relatively weak in taming the frustrated impulses? In the introduction
to Goethe's Faust, Mephistopheles, the devil, bemoans the fate of man
before God the Lord: "Man would live a little better, had you not
given him the shine of heaven's light. He calls it reason (Vernunft)
and he uses it only to be more brutish than any brute."52
B. THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM
I.
The Obligation of Law
(i)
In terms of the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and man's
"conflict between his trend toward individuation and his need for solidarity
with others,"53 it is probably crucial that both Romney and Wolfson per-
ceived themselves as members of a minority, as "outsiders" in the world in
50. Id. at 54.
51. Id. at 86. "But the conflict between impulses and foresight continues undecided
in the nonreporting parts of his brain (Freud's unconscious), threatening to return from
exile and upset man's equilibrium by an outbreak of uncontrolled rage when his frustrated
egocentric impulses overrun his need for group solidarity." Id.
52. Id. at 87. "Man's instincts are as innocent and free of guilt as the animal's instincts,
as long as the needs which guarantee his survival are not frustrated. But man's capacity of
foresight, his gift of imagination which anticipates the consequences of his behavior and
actions, frequently lead him to overreactions in response to the danger signal of fear or
anxiety. The human being is the only animal that is aware of his destiny to die, though
he does not keep this knowledge in the focus of his awareness. Yet, in his imagination
he may die a thousand deaths, and when this foresight triggers off unmanageable fears, his
adaptational behavior may be thrown out of kilter." Id.
53. Id.
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which they were operating. It is precisely this perception, in other words,
that pennitted them to treat the rules traditionally applicable to peer group
behavior as artificial rather than binding conventions. The question raised
by this analysis is the identity of the mechanism that defines the acceptable
limits in terms of which such conventions can be broken. In the United
States, as the analysis of U.M. W. v. United StatesS4. illustrates, this defining
mechanism has been the law. This article then considers the possible changes,
produced by the increasing internationalization of capitalism, in the character
of that law.
In U.M.W. the United States had entered into an agreement concerning
coal mines on May 29, 1946, 'with John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine
Workers, to govern the terms and conditions of employment "for the period
of Government possession:' On October 21, 1946, Lewis requested the Secre-
tary of the Interior to renegotiate the agreement. Secretary Krug responded
that there was no contractual basis for renegotiations concerning the original
Krug-Lewis agreement. The government, however, expressed willingness to
discuss matters within the terms of the original agreement and requested
Lewis to communicate his demands to the mine owners.
After some discussion with the government, during which the United
States refused to alter the agreement to the extent that it affected tenns and
conditions of employment, Lewis wrote to Krug "tenninating" the earlier
agreement. Ignoring the President's requests to reconsider his decision, Lewis
proceeded to circulate the letter among the mine workers for their "official
infonnation.o' The United States then sought declaratory and injunctive
relief to the effect that Lewis had no power unilaterally to tenninate the
Krug-Lewis agreement.
The district court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the
defendant union and John L. Lewis from encouraging mine workers to
strike. Three days later, the mine workers walked out, idling the mines that
furnished a major portion of the nation's coal.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the contempt charge, challenging
the jurisdiction of the court and questioning whether the Norris-LaGuardia
Act prohibited granting the government's request for the temporary restrain-
ing order. Overruling the motion, the court found defendants guilty of both
civil and criminal contempt. On notice of defendants' appeal, the United
States filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
The Court granted certiorari, and while acknowledging that section 20
of the Clayton Act provided that "no such restraining order or injunction
shall prohibit any person or persons . • . from recommending, advising.
or persuading others .. .o' to strike,55 held that the tenn, "employer," did
not include the United States.56 Among the opinions57 in this decision were
the following:
54. 330 U.s. 258 (1947).
55. 29 U.S.C. §52 (1970).
56. 330 u.s. at 275. "MR. JUSTICE JACKSON joins in this opinion except as to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act which he thinks relieved the courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions
in this class of case." ld. at 307.
57. Among the opinions pertinent to this. article are the following:
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"MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, dissenting.
"This case became a cause celebre the moment it began. No good purpose can be
served by ignoring that obvious fact. But it cannot affect our judgment save only perhaps
to steel us, if that were necessary, to the essential and accustomed behavior of judges. In
all cases great or small this must be to render judgment evenly and dispassionately accord-
ing to law, as each is given understanding to ascertain and apply it. . . .
"MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER has shown conclusively, I think, that the policy of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, applies to this situation. The legislative history
he marshals so accurately and cogently compels the conclusion that the War Labor Disputes
Act of 1943, 57 Stat. 163, not only confirms the applicability of the earlier statute, but
itself excludes resort to injunctive relief for enforcement of its own provisions in situations
of this sort." Id. at 342-43 (footnotes omitted).
"MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part.
"For the reasons given in the Court's opinion, we agree that neither the Norris-LaGuardia
Act nor the War Labor Disputes Act barred the Government from obtaining the injunction
it sought in these proceedings. The 'labor disputes' with which Congress was concerned
in the Norris-LaGuardia Act were those between private employers and their employees.
As to all such 'labor disputes: the Act drastically limited the jurisdiction of federal courts;
it barred relief by injunction except under very narrow circumstances, whether injunction
be sought by private employers, the Government or anyone else. But the attention of
Congress was neither focused upon, nor did it purport to affect, 'labor disputes: if such
they can be called, between the Government and its own employees. There was never
an intimation in the progress of the Act's passage that a labor dispute within the Act's
meaning would arise because of claims against the Government asserted collectively by
employees of the Interior, State, Justice, or any other Government department. Congress
had never in its history provided a program for fixing wages, hours, and working
conditions of its employees by collective bargaining. 'Working conditions of Government
employees had not been the subject of collective bargaining, nor been settled as a result
of labor disputes. It would require specific congressional language to persuade us that
Congress intended to embark upon such a novel program or to treat the Government
employer-employee relationship as giving rise to a 'labor dispute' in the industrial sense.
"We have no doubt that the miners became Government employees when the Govern-
ment took over the mines. It a~sumed complete control over the mines and their operation.
The fact that it utilized the managerial forces of the private owners does not detract from
the Government's complete authority. For whatever control Government agents delegated
to the private managers, those agents had full power to take away and exercise themselves.
If we thought, as is here contended, that the Government's possession and operation of
the mines were not genuine, but merely pretended, we should then say that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act barred these proceedings. For anything less than full and complete Govern-
ment operation for its own account would make this proceeding the equivalent of the
Government's seeking an injunction for the benefit of the private employers. W'e think the
Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits that. But as we read the War Labor Disputes Act and
the President's order taking over the mines against the background of circumstances which
prompted both, we think, apparently contrary to the implications of the regulations,
that the Government operates these mines for its own account as a matter of law; and
those who work in them, during the period of complete Government control, are employees
of the Government.
"Since the Norris-LaGuardia Act is inapplicable, we agree that the District Court had
power in these proceedings to enter orders necessary to protect the Government against
an invasion of the rights it asserted, pending adjudication of the controversy its complaint
presented to the court.•••
"We think it significant that the conduct which was prohibited by the restraining
order for violation of which these defendants have been punished for contempt is also
punishable under the War Labor Disputes Act. That Act provides a maximum punishment
of S5,OOO fine and one year imprisonment for those who interfere with the operation of
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MR JUSTICE MURPHY, dissenting. ' :
An objective reading of the Norris-LaGuardia Act re~oves any
doubts as to its meaning and as to its applicability to the facts of this
case. Section 4 provides in clear unmistakable language that "[n]o court
of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of any labor dispute...." That language, which is repeated
in other sections of the Act, is sufficient by itself to dispose of this case
without further ado. But when proper recognition is given ~o th.e b~ck­
ground and purpose of the Act, it becomes apparent that the ImplicatIons
of today's decision cast a dark' cloud over the future of labor relations
in the United States.
Due recognition must be given to the circumstances that gave rise
to this case. The Government was confronted with the necessity of
preserving the economic health of the, nation; dire distress would have,
eventuated here and abroad from a prolonged strike in the bituminous
coal mines. It was imperative that 'some effective action be taken to
break the stalemate. But those 'factors do not permit the conversion
of the judicial process into a weapon for misapplying statutes according
to the grave exigencies of the moment. That can have tragic con-
sequences even more serious and lasting than a temporary dislocation
of the nation's economy resulting from a strike of the miners.58
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring in the judgment.
The historic phrase "a government of laws and not of men"
epitomizes the distinguishing character of our political society. When
John Adams put that phrase into the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights he was not indulging in a rhetorical flourish. He was expressing
the aim of those who, with him, framed the Declaration of Independence
and founded the Republic. "A government of laws and not of men"
was the rejection in positive terms of rule by fiat, whether by the fiat
of governmental or 'private power. Every act of government may be
challenged by an appeal to law, as finally pronounced by this Court.
mines'taken over'by the United States. Had the defendants been tried under that statute,
their punishment would have been limited thereby and in their trial they would have
enjoyed all the constitutional safeguards of the BiIl of Rights. Whatever constitutional
safeguards are required in a summary contempt proceeding, whether it be for criminal
punishment, or for the imposition of coercive sanction, we must be ever mindful of the
danger of permitting punishment by contempt to be imposed for conduct which is identical
with an offense defined and made punishable by statute.•••
"The situation of grave emergency facing the country when the District Court acted
called for the strongest measures - measures designed to produce quick and unqualified
obedience of the court's order. If the $10,000 fine on defendant Lewis and the $3,500,000
fine on the defendant union be ~reated as coercive fines, they would not necessarily be
excessive. For they would then be payable only if the defendants continued to disobey the
court's order. Defendants could then avoid payment by purging themselves. • • •
"We should modify the District Court's decrees by making the entire amount of the
fines payable conditionaIly. On December 7, 1946, Mr. Lewis directed the mine workers
to return to work until midnight, March 31, 1947. But, so far as we are aware, ~e notice
which purported to terminate the contract has not been withdrawn. Thus, there has
been, at most, only a partial compliance with. the temporary injunction.
"Hence our judgment should provide that the defendants pay their respective fines
only in the event that fuIl and unconditional obedience to the temporary injunction, in-
cluding withdrawal of the notice which purported to terminate the contract, is not had
on or before a day certain." ld. at 328·30, 334·35 (footnotes omitted).
58. ld. at 335·.36. •... , .
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Even this Court has the last say only for a time. Being composed of
fallible men, it may err. But revision of its errors must be by orderly
process of law. The Court may be asked to reconsider its decisions,
and this has been done successfully again and again throughout our
history. Or, what this Court has deemed its duty to decide may be
changed by legislation, as it often has been, and, on occasion, by con-
stitutional amendment.
But from their own experience and their deep reading in history,
the Founders knew that Law alone saves a society from being rent by
internecine strife or ruled by mere brute power however disguised.
"Civilization involves subjection of force to reason, and the agency of this
subjection is law." The conception of a government by laws dominated
the thoughts of those who founded this Nation and designed its Constitu-
tion, although they knew as well as the belittlers of the conception that
laws have to be made, interpreted and enforced by men. To that end,
they set apart a body of men, who were to be the depositories of law,
who by their disciplined training and character and by withdrawal
from the usual temptations of private interest may reasonably be ex-
pected to be "as free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity
will admit." So strongly were the framers of the Constitution bent on
securing a reign of law that they endowed the judicial office with
extraordinary safeguards and prestige. No one, no matter how exalted
his public office or how righteous his private motive, can be judge in
his own case. That is what courts are for. And no type of controversy
is more peculiarly fit for judicial determination than a controversy
that calls into the question the power of a court to decide. Controversies
over "jurisdiction" are apt to raise difficult technical problems. They
usually involve judicial presuppositions, textual doubts, confused
legislative history, and like factors hardly fit for final determination by
the self-interest of a party.
The Government here invoked the aid of a court of equity in cir-
cumstances which certainly were not covered by the [Norris-LaGuardia]
Act with inescapable clarity. Colloquially speaking, the Government
was "running" the mines. But it was "running" them not as an em-
ployer, in the sense that the owners of the coal mines were the em-
ployers of the men the day before the Government seized the mines.
Nor yet was the relation between the Government and the men like
the relation of the Government to the civil service employees in the
Department of the Interior. It would be naive or wilful to assert that
the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in a situation like that presented
by this bill raised a question so frivolous that any judge should have
summarily thrown the Government out of court without day. Only
when a court is so obviously traveling outside its orbit as to be merely
usurping judicial forms and facilities, mayan order issued by a court
be disobeyed and treated as though it were a letter to a newspaper. Short
of an indisputable want. of authority on the part of the court, the very
existence of a court presupposes its power to entertain a controversy, if
only to decide, after deliberation, that it has no power over the
particular controversy. Whether a defendant may be brought to the
bar of justice is not for the defendant himself to decide.
In our country law is not a body of technicalities in the keeping
of specialists or in the service of any special interest. There can be no
free society without law administered through an independent judiciary.
If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what is law, every
man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny. Legal process is an
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essential part of the democratic process. For legal process is subject to
democratic control by defined, orderly ways which themselves are part
of law. In a democracy, power implies responsibility. The greater the
power that defies law the less tolerant can this Court be of defiance.
As the Nation's ultimate judicial tribunal, this Court, beyond any
other organ of society, is the trustee of law and charged with the duty
of securing obedience to it.
It only remains to state the basis of my disagreement with the
Court's views on the bearing of the Norris-LaGuardia Act ... and
the War Labor Disputes Act....59
II
The Problem of Nationality
(i)
The problems presented by the legal framework in terms of which Western
governments attempt to regulate the movement and privileges of noncitizens
reflect the more general phenomenon of the breakdown of the legal and
political conception of nationality.
In most areas in the West the social, economic, and political institutions
collectively known as the feudal system resulted in considerable modifiql.tions
of the Roman conception of nationality, which was based solely an descent.
Because fuedal institutions were primarily based on landowning, place of
birth replaced parentage as the indicia in terms of which the rights of
citizenship - full participation in the community - were measured. Because
of the relative immobility of large segments of the population, such rules
probably did not often result in undue hardship. But the conception of
nationality that they reflected persisted long after the institutions giving
rise to that conception had disappeared.
Thus, a child born of British parents outside Great Britain was not re-
garded as a British citizen until 1708.60 Similarly, laws prohibiting the owner-
ship of land by foreigners, the necessity of which is apparent in a feudal
system, were not relaxed in Great Britain until 1844, when leases up to a
term of 21 years were permitted to foreigners. In 1870 these prohibitions
were eliminated altogether.
The shift produced by feudal institutions in conceptions of nationality
substituted territorial for individual indicia. Paralleling this development
was the stress on the community in contemporary political and social theory.
Johannes Althusius lived in an era when feudal institutions were already
largely being replaced by national monarchies. But the Germanic states in
terms of which his theory was presented symbolized the last significant
59. [d. at 307-10, 312 (footnote omitted).
60. An Act for Naturalizing Foreign Protestants, 7 Anne c. 5 §3 (1708). See also
4 Geo. 2, c. 21 §1 (1731). In 1807, §9 of the Code Napoleon allowed a child born in
France of foreign parentage to claim French citizenship one year after attaining his
majority. Section 10, which represented a codification of earlier law, extended French
citizenship to children born of French parents outside the territorial limits of France.
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strongholds of particularism in Europe, and Althusius' theories contain, in
many ways, the most mature and comprehensive development of conceptions
that underlay the institutions of the earlier period.61
The key concept in the political thought of Althusius is a biological one,
that of symbiosis. Though usually regarded as a contract theorist, Althusius'
conception of human communities is firmly grounded in sociological and
biological fact. There is, therefore, a distinctly Aristotelian flavor to the sense
in which Althusius defines communities as "natural" entities.
Equally important, however, is the nature of the particular groupings
that provided the basis for Althusius' theory. The state was not, in the 16th
century, man's "natural" community, and Althusius assigned only very limited
political functions to this political entity. As in the feudal system, the
"natural" communities were those social and economic groupings based either
on possession of land or on the various guilds that organized commerce
and the professions. In terms of Althusius' theory, many economic matters
were even assigned to the family unit for disposition.
Given this stress upon "natural" communities, it seemed necessary to
postulate, as Althusius did, that a state is established, not by contract
among individuals, but rat.her by contracts among subordinate communities.6~
In part, of course, this postulate reflects the fact that institutions, in many
cases even political institutions, continued to exist outside the state, and re-
tained sufficient power to challenge the state for the loyalty of the individual.
More precisely, such a postulate represents an accurate assessment of a system
in which the privileges that an individual sought to acquire by belonging
to a community were at the disposal of many institutions other than the
state. In modern terms, the "rights" of citizenship were fragmented and
could be obtained only by belonging to a varied number of groupings, rather
than by loyalty solely to a single national state.
Althusius' state was "natural" not only in the biological sense but also in
the sense of being sanctioned by natural law. Thus, although the theory is
entirely coherent and internally consistent solely on the basis of the biological
metaphor, Althusius introduces a reference to Scripture to further justify
the validity of the contract. creating the state.
The following two centuries saw the final destruction of the legal and
biological pillars on which Althusius had erected the edifice of his theory.
With the increasing centralization of political power characteristic of the
maturing monarchical states, the expanded opportunities for mobility due
to improved transportation and communication facilities, and the rapid de-
velopment of a commercial and partially industrial rather than agricultural
economy, the system of organically linked functionally unique communities,
on which Althusius had based his state, grew increasingly divergent from
the "natural" reality. Neither could the religious sanctions embodied in
61. See generally C.J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE 62-74 (1957);
C. J. FRIEDRICH, POLITICA METHADICE DIGESTA OF JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS (1932); O. VON GIERKE,
NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY, 1500 TO 1800 (2 vol. 1934); J. PARRY, THE
POLITICAL SCIENCE OF JOHANNES ALTHI'SIUS (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Yale, 1953).
62. See O. VON GIERKE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THEORY 39 (1939).
HeinOnline -- 28 U. Fla. L. Rev. 333 1975-1976
1976] LAW AND CAPITAUSM. 833
Althusius' use of natural law long withstand the corrosive influence of
rationalistic systems of natural law such as that developed by Grotius.G3
The results of these developments became apparent in the theories of
the period preceding the French Revolution and in the course of events
during the Revolution itself. During the 18th century, nationalism and cos-
mopolitanism often developed contemporaneously, absent the catalyst of
practical political efforts. Herder, for example, who regarded language as
the definitive characteristic of a national culture and whose works propounded
the importance of the values of cultural nationalism, nevertheless strongly
advocated the value of cultural diversity, believing that the claims of com-
peting national cultures could somehow be synthesized into a worldwide har-
mony. Other important political theorists, though not advocating cosmo-
politanism, also strikingly misgauged the political implications of nationalism.
Thus Rousseau, in the Social Contmct, while apparently advocating an extreme
form of nationalism, was in fact describing a polis rather than a nation-state.
As is made amply clear by the painstaking accumulation of geographical and
demographic data in that work, the nationalism described therein was not
applicable to a nation-state such as France.
During the later stages of the French Revolution, however, a strain of
nationalism emerged from the earlier amalgam of political beliefs. Thus,
while accepting Herder's identification of culture with language, many
of the Jacobins advocated the use of compulsory French instruction as a
method of eliminating local cultures regarded by them as subversive and
erecting in their place a single and uniform national culture, rather than
following the precepts of Herder and supporting the development of local
cultures as a means towards the development of cultural diversity.G4
Furthermore, in the political sphere the revolutionaries concentrated on
the creation of a unitary administrative state by means reminiscent of the
attempts of 18th century enlightened despots to rationalize their governmental
machinery. The law on local government, for example, passed on December
22, 1789, substituted purely administrative subdivisions for the existing regional
government organizations,65 and thus went far towards completing the work
begun by the monarchy, which the Revolution had supplanted, in destroying
traditional local institutions and the loyalties that they evoked. Measures such
as these formed the background against which Burke accused the revo-
lutionaries of destroying a system of civil rights rooted in law and tradition
in the name of a set of disembodied abstractions represented by the secularized
versions of natural rights.
Whether a system of civil rights rooted in law and tradition had existed in
France prior to the Revolution, Burke himself represented a political and
cultural tradition significantly different from that which was developing on the
63. Sec generally A. P. D'ENTREVFS, NATURAL LAW (1951).
64. "[F]ederalism and superstition speak low-Breton; emigration and the hatred of
the Republic speak German; the counterrevolution speaks Italian, and fanaticism speaks
Basque. Let us break these weapons of shame and terror."· Speech of Barere to the Con-
vention on January 27, 1794, reprinted in MONIIEUR, XVII 775 (1794).
65. For the text of this law, see DUVERGlER, et aI., I COLLECTION COMPLETE DFS LOIS,
DECRETS, ORDONNANCES, REGLEMENTS, AVIS DU CoNSEIL D'ETAT 63 (1934).
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Continent. The contrasts between the Revolutions of 1688 and 1789 are sig-
nificant on many levels other than that represented by a history of changes in
governmental forms. In terms of Burk's thought, the fact that the British
political and social structures proved capable of accommodating change within
a stable framework was what ultimately made it possible for him to contrast
the concrete reality of civil rights with the abstract chimerae propounded by
theorists who proclaimed the natural rights of man. Similarly, insofar as
Burke himself was a natural law theorist, he could take such a position pre-
cisely because he lived in a society in which positive law in fact served to
guarantee a certain measure of individual rights.
More specifically, the British conception of nationality was molded by a
variety of factors, many of which were unique to the island kingdom. The
English experience of merging with the political entities of Wales and Scot-
land necessarily introduced an element of elasticity into the conception of
British citizenship. If these constituent parts of the United Kingdom were
in some sense conquered provinces, they were, in another sense, also equals.
The common citizenship of England and Scotland today symbolizes the extent
to which nationality perforce had become accepted as a means of reconciling
significant cultural and social diversity with political stability.
Equally important, the rapidly developing overseas empire created a
situation in which significant numbers of British nationals spent considerable
portions of their lives outside the national territorial boundaries. Finally, a
commitment to free trade doctrines resulted in the deprecation, in a practical
sense, of the importance to be attached to the reality of the cartographic
lines representing national boundaries. As Schumpeter notes in his study,
Imperialism, when faced with international markets, capitalism as an economic
system expands to meet the demand of these markets. What confines capitalistic
economies within national boundaries is politics, not economics.66 During the
19th century, however, a significant portion of the world economy was regulated
by the London financial markets, and British international politics was to a
remarkable degree devoted to the task of buttressing the position of economic
hegemony won by the stability of sterling. As a result of this effective
collaboration, the interests of London bankers were truly international, and
the exclusive elements in concepts of nationality were, at least as a matter
of economic reality, to that extent weakened.67
Whether or not Britain's predominant economic position during the
19th century made the commitment to a free trade position inevitable, the
political fact is that such a commitment existed. Fully developed free-trade
doctrines encompassed, often in the form of unspoken assumptions, a commit-
ment to free trade in persons as well as goods. To some extent, the acceptance
of free trade doctrines undoubtedly helped to make possible the massive
immigration movements of the 19th century.6S At the same time, however.
the swelling tide of emigrants failed to produce changes in the legal con-
ceptions of British nationality. In spite of the number of persons leaving
66. See J. A. SCHUMPETER, IMPERIALISM AND SOCIAL CLASSES 64-98 (1955).
67. See E. H. CARR, NATIONALISM AND AFTER 14-16 (1945).
68. See generally J. ISAAC, ECONOMICS OF MIGRATION 19-22 (1947).
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European shores every year, no European state in the early 19th century
made provision for changes of nationality on the part of its citizens.69 And
Great Britain recognized the ability of British subjects to change their
nationality only in 1870.10
In part, the law of nationality failed to respond to the needs of the
emigrants because of the conflicting pressures generated by the Britons who
left their homeland not as emigrants but as civil servants. The necessity for
.preserving a sense of nationality among the colonies of Britons who lived
abroad was reflected in legal doctrines that created a concept of British
nationality, which, if tenuous, also greatly stressed elements of permanence.
"Once an Englishman, always an Englishman" became a maxim that was
embodied in the positive law of British nationality.11 Thus, neither circum-
stances of birth, marriage, nor residence served to produce denaturalization.
As might be expected, the result of the British position of nationality was
the development of legal rules in the countries to which Britons emigrated,
in terms of which changes of nationality were recognized as the result of
circumstances that would not have produced such a change under British
law.12
The eventual acceptance of the possibility of legal changes of nationality,
furthermore, was the result, not of a more complete understanding and
acceptance of free trade doctrines, but rather of the development - both in
theory and practice - of a view of emigration as an antidote to overpopulation
and unemployment. Britain's rapid industrialization early exposed her to the
vicissitudes of recurrent depressions. The economic difficulties caused by the
disbandment of the armed forces after the Napoleonic wars, the popularity
of the wage-fund theory, in which only a fixed amount of money in the
economy is available for wages, and the disillusionment within the working
class as a result of the collapse of the early trade union movement led by
Robert Owen, all helped to make of emigration an acceptable solution to
economic ills. Eventually, even labor organizations developed an emigration
fund for the use of members. And the increasing acceptance of emigration
gradually brought with it recognition of the possibility of changes in
nationality.
The lateness of national unification in German history might be thought
to have contributed to the preservation of local loyalties, and thus to a more
tenuous and possibly fragmented form of loyalty to the nation-state than that
characteristic of older states. The conception of federalism had already become
important in Germany before the unification as a result of the federal constitu-
tion proposed by the Frankfurt Assembly in 1848. What is striking about the
69. Note, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 502 (1916).
70. Expatriation, 33 &: 34 Vict. c. 14, §6 (1870).
71. In terms of the more technical legal definition of domicil, for example, British
courts continue to hold that the domicil of origin revives whenever an individual leaves
a domicil of choice. See, e.g., Bell v. Kennedy [1868] L.R. I Sc. & Div. App. 307. And it is
still a good deal easier to lose a domicil of choice than a domicil of origin under British
law. Winans v. A·G [1904] A.C. 287; Ramsay v. Liverpool Royal Infirmary [1930] A.C. 588.
72. For the best known example in United States jurisprudence, see In re Estate of
Jones, 192 Iowa 78, 182 N.W. 227 (1921).
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two leading German constitutional theorists of the generation following the
Assembly is the extent of their debt to American thought. George Waitz
proposed a theory based on divided sovereignty, drawn from the models that
he found in the Federalist and the works of de Tocqueville. With the publica-
tion of a critical article in 1872, Max von Seydel, a Bavarian, led an ultimately
successful attack on Waitz' theories. Drawing heavily on Calhoun, von Seydel
insisted that the conception of divided sovereignty was logically indefensible.'3
Although von Seydel, like Calhoun, posited sovereignty, by definition in-
divisible, in the constituent states, it is obvious that his arguments can also
be used to justify the possession of an exclusive sovereignty on the part of the
central government. The latter course was the one that tended to dominate
later German thought.
The emphasis on the national government in Germany following unifica-
tion is due to a variety of factors. The overwhelming influence of Prussia
tended to make any federal organization largely illusory. This was especially
true in the period following the triumphant conclusion of the Franco-Prussian
War when Prussian prestige was at its height in Germany as a result of the
unification, and Bismarck had succeeded in humbling the Liberals in the
Prussian parliament. In part, too, a theory based on divided sovereignty proved
unacceptable in Germany because of the prevalence of monarchial institutions.
Such a theory seems peculiarly difficult to reconcile with an institutional
framework in which ultimate authority inheres in a single monarch rather
than in the people. The importance of this institutional framework becomes
apparent once it is recalled that in Germany, as opposed to France, nationalism
was associated with monarchy rather than democracy, as a result of the events
leading to the unification.a
Theories of sovereignty do not by themselves, however, lead to exclusive
national loyalties. As in England, the economic element in Germany's develop-
ment following the unification played a decisive role in molding conceptions
of the nature of German nationality. Aided by the war indemnity of five
billion French francs between 1871 and 1873, Germany's industrialization was
both rapid and comprehensive. But the European and world markets in which
her products attempted to compete had already been divided into national
enclaves to an extent that had not been thought possible when Britain
first underwent industrialization. As a result, in 1878 Bismarck disavowed the
policy of free trade and introduced tariffs both to protect Prussian grain
producers from cheap Russian, United States, and Canadian wheat and to
benefit the expanding iron industries. Created by "blood and iron," the Ger-
man Empire was maintained by the alliance of "iron and grain." Equally im-
portant, this state intervention in the national economy created a precedent
employed by Bismarck in his attempt to meet the political threat posed by
the rapidly increasing power of the Socialist organizations. The social security
measures promulgated during the later years of Bismarck's tenure in office
represented an attempt to "nationalize" the demands of workers. The state,
73. See R. EMERSON, STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN GERMANY 92-100 (1928) (Gennan
theories of federalism).
74. See generally L. KRIEGER, THE GERMAN IDEA OF FREEJ;lOM 1-80 (1957).
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in short, by becoming responsive to the demands of groups that had recently
become socially and politically aware, ended by formulating solutions to
social problems in terms of a framework of national dimensions. By acting
to satisfy some of the basic demands of the socialists, Bismarck may have
intended only to neutralize a potential political threat, albeit a serious one;
in so doing, however, he succeeded also in establishing a precedent for the
channeling of social demands into the governmental machinery of the state.
Insofar as the state was responsive to such demands, it was expanding its con-
trol over the economy of the nation; consequently, decisions by the govern-
ment increasingly served to mold the community that it ruled. Any pattern
that the state succeeded in imposing, however, was necessarily limited to the
territory over which it exercised jurisdiction, and the recipients of state
bounty, having wrested concessions from the state, had no desire to share
the fruits of their labor more widely than was necessary. As the state became
more powerful, therefore, it also tended to become increasingly exclusive, in
the sense both of a lack of institutions that could compete with it for the
loyalty of individuals and of an increasing reluctance to extend the benefits
of state membership to persons who were not nationals/a
It is against this background that the relevance of Hegelian political
theories to the development of conceptions of nationality must be assessed.
Although Hegel's works were published even before the meeting of the Frank-
furt Assembly and were 'written as much in terms of a Prussian as a German
state, the conception of the state as a moral force that infuses the mechanistic
workings of civil society with valuative elements appears meaningful primarily
in terms of an already industrialized society. The contrast with Althusius is
obvious, for the Hegelian state has a monopoly on moral worth. Man as a moral
being is a member, not of an organically linked set of constituent communities,
but of a single nation-state.76 Lesser communities, which in terms of Althusius'
theory formed the constituent elements of the state - indeed, created the state
by means of a contract among themselves - are subsumed, in Hegelian terms,
under the head of civil society, subject to the amoral workings of purely
mechanistic and nonvaluative laws. This moral value inherent in' nationality
is, moreover, an exclusive one. Just as the economic order imposed by states
on their constituent societies is necessarily limited by territorial jurisdiction,
so the moral values posited in Hegel's philosophy are embodied by finite
entities in constant competition with one another. The monopoly of moral
worth by a single political entity in Hegel's system carried with it, in this
way, the destruction of the earlier conception of citizenship as a synthesis of
the values of membership i!1 a series of diverse groupings.
The contrast presented above between the development of British and
German conceptions of nationality is, of course, an oversimplified one. Not
only did the traditions of the Frankfurt Assembly continue to develop in
75. See generally E. CARR, NATIONALISM AND AFTER 22-24 (1945).
76. "Mind is actual only as that which it knows itself to be, and the state, as the
mind of a nation, is both the law permeating all relationships within the state and also
at the same time the manners and consciousness of its citizens." G. F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT 178-79 (T.M. Knox trans!. 1953). For a discussion of Hegel's theory or-the
state, see E. CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 263-76 (1961).
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competition with Hegelian conceptions in Germany, but Hegelian theories also
significantly influenced political thought in Great Britain. The theories pro-
pounded by T.H. Green and the influence of the works of Coleridge on the
thought of John Stuart Mill provide examples of this development.
Significantly, especially in the case of Green, Hegelian elements were adopted
precisely because they provided a means for analyzing the moral responsibility
that the state was felt to bear in connection with problems created by the
continuing process of industrialization. The earlier British development, based
on individualist theories such as that of Locke, which had provided the con-
ceptual underpinnings for free trade agitation and the Manchester school of
economic liberalism, was proving insufficient even in the United Kingdom.
And since the problems presented by maturing industrial societies increasingly
faced the governments of other western states as well, the Hegelian model
may serve as a tool for ana.lyzing the development of conceptions of nationality
outside Germany.
As indicated above, Hegelian models serve as a means of analyzing not
only a German conception of the meaning of nationality, but the impact that
growing industrialization had generally on conceptions of nationality. The
state, forced in response to such demands to intervene in national economies,
to arbitrate between competing moral and economic claims, inevitably ex-
panded the range of its sphere of operation by expropriating the power to
regulate the workings of other institutions and groups in the society. It also
claimed for its decisions a superior morality in order to justify the imposition
of such decisions on other groups.
The process of expanding the claims of the sovereign nation was carried
to its logical extreme in 20th century Germany. The centralizing tendencies
evident even in the Weimar constitution may in part have been due to a
continuing conception of authority as located above rather than within the
social framework. Thus, under the Weimar constitution, the central govern-
ment obtained rigorous control of financial matters. As contrasted with the
provision in the United States Constitution making the consent of a state
mandatory in any attempt to deprive it even of its equal vote in the Senate,
the Weimar government could itself dissolve the constituent states and trans-
form Germany into a unitary state by constitutional amendment.77
With the coming to power of the National Socialists, the concentration
of functions in the central government was carried to completion. Since the
Nazi Party existed outside the state, power, in a sense, cannot be said to
have been centered in the state itself, but the total direction that the Nazi
Party exercised over the activities of German citizens was made possible by
the near-monopOly on power that had been enjoyed by the governmental
machinery to which it succeeded. In implementing this policy, the Nazi
government discontinued the separate police force and postal system that
had been maintained by the state of Bavaria under preceding regimes, and
in 1934 state citizenship was abolished as part of the attempt to create a
truly unitary German state.
77. See WEIMAR CONSTITUTION art. 76 (1919).
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Similarly, the Nazi regime demanded exclusive loyalty from Germans
living abroad, even if such individuals had adopted the citizenship of the
state in which they were living, and refused completely to accommodate the
demands of other governments to control, at least partially, the activities
of those of their nationals who resided in Germany. Thus, the Nazi govern-
ment insisted that Nazi law be applied to German activity wherever it
occurred and simultaneously refused to apply anything other than Nazi law
to disputes arising within German borders, regardless of the nationalities of
the parties involved.78 Such ultimate claims over national territory and
nationals living abroad, if made by more than one government, are, of course,
irreconcilable, except for the unlikely contingency of a complete identity
among the various systems of national law. The relevance of the Nazi example,
however, lies in the fact that what occurred was only the carrying to extremes
of policies that were already being followed by the governments of most
industrialized states.
(ii)
Even governments whose claims on nationals living abroad are not
couched in terms as extreme as those characteristic of Nazi ideology are being
forced to recognize the contradi~tions inherent in the conceptions of
nationality in terms of which economic and social policies are being formulated.
As states increasingly seek to control the activities of individuals, national
borders come to be regarded as tools that can be utilized to evade such
governmental controls. Increasingly, for example, commercial enterprises
utilize the device of foreign incorporation in order to evade the regulatory
activities of the governments in whose territory business is conducted.79 Given
the increasingly interdependent nature of the world economy, no national
scheme of economic regulation can succeed without a significant measure of
control over activities occurring outsid~ national boundaries;80 but the achieve-
ment of such. control is predicated. on the willingness to compromise to some
extent the exclusiveness of sovereign claims over these activities.
This fact had led, during the 19th centuiy, to the movement in the field
of conflict of laws directed toward the ideal of all courts applying the laws
of places where the activities in dispute occurred, rather than the laws of
. .
. 78. See E. RABEL, II THE CONFLICT OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 560 (1947). For
commentary on Italian fascist attitudes toward Italians living abroad, see Wignore, Domicile,
Double Allegian.ce.. and World Citizenship, 21 ILL. L. REv. 761, 761-63 (1927).
79. See generally A. NUSSBA~, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONA.L LAw 146-47
(1943), and two articles by Timberg, International Combines and National Sovereigns,
95 U. PENN. L. REv. 575 (1947); Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and International
Implications, 46 CoLUM. L. REv. 533, 571·80 (1946). .
80. See, e,g., United Stat~ v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 442-43 (2d Cir.
1945) (cartel agreement was not signed by Alcoa); United States v. Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 955 (D. Mass. 1950) (cartel agreement did not cover
United States markets); United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F~ Supp. 753, 887 (D.N.].
1949) (same); Comment, The Diamond Cartel, 56 YALE L.]. 1404 (1947) (successful avoidance
of prosecution by remaining outside United States tl;rptorial limits).
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the telTitories in which the courts themselves were located.81 It had long been
held, for example, that courts would refuse to apply the penal laws of another
sovereign state.82 But this doctrine was rapidly eroded on the basis of a dis-
tinction between penal and remedial legislation,83 which was said to depend
on whether the statute in question punished an offense against public justice
or provided a remedy for injury to private interests.84 The theory was that
laws providing a remedy for injury to private interests did not involve any
governmental interests of either the foreign state or the state in which the
court was located, and could therefore be applied by all courts to any
disputes involving such transactions without the necessity for choosing between
the policies of two sovereign governments. Both British and United States
courts, for example, held that a statute imposing liability for all corporate
debts on corporate officers who signed falsified certificates was not penal for
conflict-of-Iaw purposes and could therefore be applied by the courts of other
sovereign states.85
Such a distinction might have been meaningful in terms of the laissez-faire
philosophy of an age that could still clearly distinguish a limited area of
public activity from the private sector of the economy. But with the continued
growth of an industrialized economy came an expansion of governmental
interference in the economy, ranging from nationalization through regulatory
legislation to unofficial approval of cartelization. Much recent economic legisla-
tion, as a result, is neither wholly public nor private. Such legislation represents
a declaration of the public interest in private transactions;86 thus, it seems
difficult to apply foreign law in a dispute involving such a transaction on the
theory that no governmental interests are involved. On the contrary, because
totalitarian governments insisted that their laws should be applied in all
cases coming before courts located in their territory, some commentators
suggested, with particular reference to the United States, that nontotalitarian
nations should also totally refuse to apply foreign laws in any disputes coming
before their courts, even in cases where the disputes in question involve
81. See generally Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law-af-Nations Doctrine in the
Conflict of Law, 42 COLUl\[. L. REV. 189 (1942); Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of
Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. RE\'. 775, 796-817 (1955). Professor Rheinstein stresses the
political aspects of this development and, more particularly, the development of a con-
ception of jus gentium - whose origin he traces to Rome - regarded as valid over the
whole of Europe.
82. See, e.g., Richardson ,. New York Central R.R., 98 Mass. 85 (1867) (wrongful
death statute). For recent examples, see Government of India v. Taylor [1955) 1 All E.R.
292 (H.L.) (refusal to enforce political or revenue laws of a Commonwealth nation); Trinidad
Shipping & Trading Co. v. G.R. Alston & Co. [1920) A.C. 888 (P.C.) (United States law
making payment of rebates illegal no defense in an action on a contract made in Britain
by British subjects). See generally Lellar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental
Claims, 46 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1932).
83. See, e.g., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
8'1. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74 (1892). The British courts take
a similar position. See G.C. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 131-32 (5th ed. 1957).
85. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 677 (1892); Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] A.C.
150 (P.C.).
86. See generally Katzenbach, Conflicts On An Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and
Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1087-93 (1956).
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transactions having taken place in foreign states.87 The theory underlying
this position is that, since all laws are public in the sense of representing
governmental policies, courts, whatever the nature of the transaction involved
in the dispute before them, must prefer the policies of the government in whose
territory they sit and therefore apply the government's laws.
Whatever the surface plausibility of such a doctrine, it is clear that the
interdependent nature of national economies makes its application im-
practicable. So long as persons and goods are mobile across national
boundaries, a flat refusal of courts to apply anything other than their own
national law to disputes before them must end in a welter of conflicting judg-
ments whenever those laws differ. Furthermore, a refusal to apply foreign
laws may very well result in the foreign state's refusal to enforce within its
territory any judgments other than those rendered by its own courts. But the
possibility that national legislation may be violated by foreign corporations
or by means of transactions centered in other nations necessitates reliance on
the willingness of other states to enforce judgments based on such violations
within their territories. Even in terms of the efficacy of national legislative
programs, a refusal to apply foreign laws in national courts is ultimately self-
defeating.
The need for such inter-jurisdictional comity was explicitly recognized
in the case of United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries.88 The decree
in that case required ICI, a British corporation, to divest itself of certain
patents that it had obtained from DuPont. ICI, however, together with
another British firm, had already created a corporation known as British Nylon
Spinners (BNS), to which it had granted an exclusive license under the patents
in question. British Nylon Spinners thereupon applied to the British courts
for an injunction restraining ICI from complying with the United States
decree and ordering it to execute the license, and the decree was granted.89
These contradictory judgments have been explained as the result of
different findings of fact,90 the United States district court having found
that BNS was created in an attempt to circumvent the proposed decree,91
while the British court found that BNS was not a party to the conspiracy.92
The British court did not rely on this finding of fact but based its decision
on the grounds that BNS had not been before the United States court and
that the territorial principal had been violated by the United States decree
since the contract for the license was a British contract made in Britain be-
tween two British corporations.93
Despite its reliance on the territorial principle, the British Court of
Appeal stressed its desire to maintain comity with the United States judicial
87. See Kronstein, Crisis of 'Conflict of Laws', 37 CEO. L.J. 483 (1949); Nussbaum,
Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027 (1940).
88. 105 F. Supp. 215, 229·31 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (decree).
89. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd.. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch. 19 (C.A.),
made permanent, [1955] 1 Cil. 37 (1954).
90. See W.L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE- AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 91-92 (1958).
91. 105 F. Supp. at 230-31.
92. [1955] 1 Cil. at 47.
93. Id. at 51·52.
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system.94 Similarly, the district court indicated that its decision conformed
with a British public policy condemning monopolies.95 But this view overlooks
significant differences between British and United States antitrust legislation,96
and, more importantly, it fails to recognize that the policy of the British patent
laws is to foster domestic production at the expense of imports97 and would
thus be opposed to any attempt to subject holders of British patents to foreign
competition. In fact, this British patent policy had been proved in the United
States court.OS
Rather than embarking on a dubious attempt to find conformity between
conflicting policies, the United States court might have been better advised
to recognize explicitly the existence of conflicting policies, stress the possibilities
for evasion that have threatened to render United States regulatory legislation
ineffective in the absence of extratenitorial enforcement, and indicate the
factors that led it to regard the United States interest as the more important in
the particular transaction involved. Had this been done, the British court
would have been faced with the choice between comity and territoriality,
and might therefore have found it more difficult to persist in its refusal99 to
accept the district court's finding as to the attempted evasion of United States
legislation. Had the United States court's finding of fact been accepted, the
Court of Appeal's injunction against compliance with the United States decree
could have been justified only on the basis that the British interest out-
weighed that of the United States in the particular case. Faced with the
necessity of making such a determination, it is at least arguable that the
Court of Appeal would have decided the case differently.
The difficulty with any such decision, however, would be the damage it
would inevitably entail to the paramount need for certainty in the law. It
is the need for certainty, darity, and clear and definite standards, the search
for "logic" in the law, that made so satisfying the formulation that courts
in applying conflict of laws principles were attempting to apply the law that
governed the dispute at issue rather than the law of the territory in which
the court sat.100
Such a formula is effective precisely insofar as it gives the appearance
of controlling the future, of defining the ways in which the law will be
applied without resort to such concepts as "the length of the Chancellor's
foot." It is equitable concepts like the latter that have historically been
invoked101 to justify applications of formulas incapable of satisfactory
94. Id. at 53. The United States court also recognized the need for comity. 105 F. Supp.
at 229.
95. 105 F. Supp. at 229.
96. See Comment, The British Monopolies Act of 1948: A Contrast With American
Policy and Practice, 59 YALE L.J. 899 (1950).
97. See BOOKER, THE PROBLEM OF BRITAIN'S OVERSEAS TRADE 171 (1948); Recent Cases,
66 HARV. L. REV. 924, 926 (1953).
98. 105 F. Supp. at 229-30.
99. [1955] 1 Ch. at 53-54.
100. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
101. See note 27 supra.
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rationalization.10ll The effectiveness of such justifications, however, is
ultimately rooted in a shared sense of governing norms - the expression of
the human need for "solidarity"103 - that may not be capable of being brought
to bear on disputes concerning transactions that involve significantly disparate
national communities.
III
Law, Capitalism, and the Future
(i)
United States v. Bassl04
The prisoner was indicted under the eighth section of the act of
congress, passed in 1790 (1 Gord. Dig. p. 62 [I Stat. 113]), for that he,
being a citizen of the United States, to wit, of Richmond, in the state
of Virginia, on the 15th day of June, 1818, with force and arms, upon
the high seas, to wit, off the Peak of Pico, out of the jurisdiction of any
particular state, then being on board a certain schooner or vessel then
belonging and appertaining to a certain citizen or citizens of the United
States to the jurors unknown, did piratically and feloniously set upon,
attack, board, break, and enter a certain merchant ship or vessel called
the San Joao Baptista, a ship of certain persons to the jurors unknown,
and did assault certain mariners, whose names are to the jurors un-
known, and did put them in corporal fear and danger of their lives,
and the said vessel, her tackle, apparel, and furniture, of the value
of twenty thousand dollars, a quantity of sugar in boxes, of the value
of twenty thousand dollars, and a quantity of coffee in bags, of the
value of one thousand dollars, being on board said vessel, the goods
and chattels of persons unknown, in the care and possession of said
mariners, did piratically and feloniously steal, take, and carry away,
against the peace, etc., and contrary to the form of the statute.
LIVINGSTON, Circuit Justice, in the decision of the court, said,
that he was aware that many abuses have existed and still do exist in
relation to captures made of Spanish and Portuguese vessels, by color
of authority emanating from the governments of the independent
provinces in South America. With regard to the question whether an
American citizen could enter into foreign service, and make captures of
vessels belonging to a power at amity with the United States, it was
sufficient to say that this has not been prohibited by any act of
congress. And with regard to the question relative to the sufficiency
of blank commissions, it was well known that Mr. Genet, while minister
from the French republic to the government of the United States,
pursued the same practice, to a considerable extent. Here the principal
question is, whether this commission, so put on board this vessel by an
agent of the Artegas government, is to be considered a nullity. In the
opinion of the court, in a case of life or death, this commission is
102. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 6, 51·52 supra.
104. 24 F. Cas. 1028 (No. 14,537 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1819».
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sufficient to exculpate the prisoner from the charge laid in the indict-
ment.
The jury immediately acquitted the prisoner. lOS
(ii)
The danger represented by the increasing internationalization of capitalism
can be expressed in terms of United States v. Bass, as the danger of a law so
singularly logical and rational, so much a ''''eberian ideal type, that it can
be applied by a judge without a jury. Whether such a law will be obeyed and
will function as a successful control device is a question that can, perhaps,
best be illustrated by a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States
concerning the application of the contempt power to the leader of a smaller
territorial unit of government than that represented by the court rendering
the decision.
United States v. Bametflo6
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This proceeding in criminal contempt was commenced by the
United States upon the specific order, sua sponte, of the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. Ross R. Barnett, Governor of the State of
Mississippi at the time this action arose, and Paul B. Johnson, Jr.,
Lieutenant Governor, stand charged with willfully disobeying certain
restraining orders issued, or directed to be entered, by that court.
Governor Barnett and Lieutenant Governor Johnson moved to dismiss,
demanded a trial by jury and filed motions to sever and to strike various
charges. The Court of Appeals, being evenly divided on the question
of right to jury trial, has certified the question to this Court under
the authority of 28 U.S.C. §1254(3). 330 F.2d 369. We pass only on the
jury issue and decide that the alleged contemners are not entitled to a
jury as a matter of right.
The proceeding is the aftermath of the efforts of James Meredith, a
Negro, to attend the University of Mississippi. Meredith sought ad-
mission in 1961 and, upon refusal, filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. That court
denied relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed and directed the
District Court to grant the relief prayed for. MeTedith v. FaiT, 305 F.2d
343. The mandate was stayed by direction of a single judge of the
Court of Appeals, whereupon, on July 27, the Court of Appeals set
aside the stay, recalled the mandate, amended and reissued it, including
its own injunctive order "enjoining and compelling" the Board of
Trustees, officials of the University and all persons having knowledge
of the decree to admit Meredith to the school. On the following day
the Court of Appeals entered a separate and supplemental "injunctive
order" directing the same parties to admit Meredith and to refrain from
any act of discrimination relating to his admission or continued at-
tendance. By its terms, this order was to remain in effect "until such
time as there has been full and actual compliance in good faith with
each and all of said orders by the actual admission of [Meredith]. .. :'
105. Id. at 1028-29.
106. 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
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After a series of further delays, the District Court entered its injunc-
tion on September 13, 1962, directing the members of the Board of
Trustees and the officials of the University to register Meredith.
When it became apparent that the decrees might not be honored, the
United States applied to the Court of Appeals on September 18 for per-
mission to appear in the Court of Appeals in the case. This application
was granted in the following terms: "IT IS ORDERED that the United
States be designated and authorized to appear and participate as amicus
curiae in all proceedings in this action before this Court and by reason
of the mandates and orders of this Court of July 27, 28, 1962, and sub-
sequently thereto, also before the District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi to accord each court the benefit of its views
and recommendations, with the right to submit pleadings, evidence,
arguments and briefs and to initiate such further proceedings, including
proceedings for injunctive relief and proceedings for contempt of
court, as may be appropriate in order to maintain and preserve the
due administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial processes
of the United States." Meanwhile, the Mississippi Legislature had
adopted an emergency measure in an attempt to prevent Meredith from
attending the University, but on September 20, upon the Government's
application, the enforcement of this Act was enjoined, along with two
state court decrees barring Meredith's registration. On the same day
Meredith was rebuffed in his efforts to gain admission. Both he and
the United States filed motions in contempt in the District Court citing
the Chancellor, the Registrar and the Dean of the College of Liberal
Arts. After a hearing they were acquitted on the ground that the
Board of Trustees had stripped them of all powers to act on Meredith's
application and that such powers were in Governor Barnett, as agent
of the Board.
The United States then moved in the Court of Appeals for a show-
cause order in contempt against the Board of Trustees, based on the
order of that court dated July 28. An en banc hearing was held at which
the Board indicated that it was ready to admit Meredith, and on
September 24 the court entered an order requiring the Board to revoke
its action appointing Governor Barnett to act as its agent. The Order
also required the Registrar, Robert B. Ellis, to be available on Sep-
tember 25 to admit Meredith.
On the evening of September 21, the United States filed an ancillary
action to the Meredith v. Fair litigation seeking a temporary restraining
order against the State of Mississippi, Governor Barnett, the Attorney
General of Mississippi, the Commissioner of Public Safety and various
lesser officials. This application specifically alleged that the Governor
had implemented the State's policy of massive resistance to the court's
orders, by personal action, as well as by use of the State's various
agencies, to frustrate and destroy the same; that the Governor's action
would result in immediate and irreparable injury to the United States,
consisting of impairment of the integrity of its judicial processes, ob-
struction of the administration of justice and deprivation of Meredith's
declared rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
On the basis of such allegations and at the specific instance of the
United States as the sole moving party and on its own behalf, the
Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order at 8:30 a.m. on
the 25th against each of these parties restraining them from performing
specific acts set out therein and from interfering with or obstructing
by any means its order of July 28 and that of the District Court of
September 13. Thereafter the United States filed a verified application
showing that on the afternoon of the 25th Governor Barnett, "having
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actual knowledge of ... [the temporary restraining order], deliberately
prevented James H. Meredith from entering the office of the Board of
Trustees ... at a time when James H. Meredith was seeking to appear
before Robert B. Ellis in order to register ... and that by such conduct
Ross R. Barnett did wilfully interfere with and obstruct James H.
Meredith in the enjoyment of his rights under this Court's order of
July 28, 1962 ... all in violation of the terms of the temporary re-
straining order entered by the Court this day." The court then entered
a show-cause order in contempt against Governor Barnett requiring
him to appear on September 28. On September 26, a similar order was
issued against Lieutenant Governor Johnson requiring him to appear
on September 29. On September 28, the Court of Appeals, en banc and
after a hearing, found the Governor in civil contempt and directed that
he be placed in the custody of the Attorney General and pay a fine of
$,10,000 for each day of his recalcitrance, unless he purged himself by
October 2. On the next day Lieutenant Governor Johnson was found
in contempt by a panel of the court and a similar order was entered
with a fine of $5,000 a day.
On September 30, President Kennedy issued a proclamation com-
manding all persons engaged in the obstruction of the laws and the
orders of the courts to "cease and desist therefrom and to disperse and
retire peaceably forthwith." 76 Stat. 1506. The President also issued an
Executive Order dispatching a force of United States Marshals and a
detachment of the armed forces to enforce the court's orders. On Sep-
tember 30, Meredith, accompanied by the Marshals, was moved into
a dormitory on the University campus and was registered the next day.
Although rioting broke out, order was soon restored, with some
casualties, and Meredith carried on his studies under continuous guard
until his graduation.
On November 15, 1962, the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, appointed
the Attorney General or his designated assistants to prosecute this
criminal contempt proceeding against the Governor and Lieutenant
Governor pursuant to Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. On application of the Attorney General, the Court of
Appeals issued a show-cause order in criminal contempt based on the
Court of Appeals' temporary restraining order of September 25, its in~
junctive order of July 28, and the District Court's order of September 13.
It is out of this proceeding that the certified question arises.
As we have said, the sole issue before us is whether the alleged
contemners are entitled as a matter of right to a jury trial on the
charges.
Finally, it is urged that those charged with criminal contempt
have a constitutional right to a jury trial. This claim has been made
and rejected here again and again. Only six years ago we held a full
review of the issue in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958). We
held there that H[t]he statements of this Court in a long and unbroken
line of decisions involving contempts ranging from misbehavior in court
to disobedience of court orders establish beyond peradventure that
criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitu-
tional right." At 183.107
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS
joins, dissenting.
In Green the Court affirmed a three-year sentence imposed for
107. Id. at 692.
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criminal contempt. But now in note 12 of its opinion in the present
case the Court has inserted an ambiguous statement which intimates
that if a sentence of sufficient "severity" had already been imposed on
these defendants, a majority of the Court would now overrule Green
in part, by holding that if a criminal contempt charge is tried without
allowing the defendant a jury trial, punishment is constitutionally
limited to that customarily meted out for "petty offenses." ["Some
members of the Court are of the view that, without regard to the
seriousness of the offense, punishment by summary trial without a jury
would be constitutionally limited to that penalty provided for petty
offenses. . . ."]108 I welcome this as a halting but hopeful step in the
direction of ultimate judicial obedience to the doubly proclaimed
constitutional command that all people charged with a crime, including
those charged with criminal contempt, must be given a trial with all
the safeguards of the Bill of Rights, including indictment by grand jury
and trial by jury.10a
MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE
and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS join, dissenting.
In response to the certified question, I would answer that defendants
have both a statutory and a constitutional right to have their case
tried by a jury.1l0
, IV
The Length of the Chancellor's Foot
We know him (God) to be a living being with every essential
property and attribute of personality - that he thinks, wills, feels, that
he is a moral being who demands righteousness and justice - but that
in his love he is compassionate, merciful, and longsuffering. For us
God is not an abstraction, he is not just an idea, a metaphysical
principle, an impersonal force or power. He is not identical with the
totality of the world, with the sum of all reality. He is not an
"absolute" that in some way embraces the whole of reality in his being.
Like us, he exists in a world of space and time. Like us, he has ends
to be achieved, and he fashions a cosmic plan for realizing them. He
is a concrete, living person, and though in our finite state we cannot
fully comprehend him, we know that we are akin to him, for he is
revealed to us in the divine personality of his Son Jesus Christ.1l1
The theological criticism most generally directed at Mormonism is that
of anthropomorphism, the confusion of the human and the Divine. This
criticism is based on a definition of God essential to Protestantism: it in-
corporates the distinction between the "spirits" of Catholicism1l2 and
Protestantism,ll3 and it involves the fundamental nature of the distinction
between the human and the Divine that was perhaps most clearly articulated
for the lay audience by Paul Tillich.1l4
108. Id. at 695.
109. Id. at 724, 726-27.
110. Id. at 728.
111. H.B. BROWN, IMPROVEMENT ERA 458 (1967).
112. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
113. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
114. P. TILUCH, BmuCAL RELIGION AND THE SEARCH FOR ULTIMATE REALITY (1955).
HeinOnline -- 28 U. Fla. L. Rev. 348 1975-1976
348 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
The extent to which Protestantism was incapable of developing human
institutions that were consonant with the divergence between the Catholic
and Protestant perceptions of the Divine1l5 is perhaps best symbolized by
the formula for ending warfare between German Protestants and Catholics
embodied in the Religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555, which provided that
the individual's choice of religion was a matter to be determined by the
religion professed by the monarch in whose territory one resided. What is
politically important about this theological criticism of anthropomorphism is
that it is rooted in the Mormon refusal to accept the fundamental significance
of original sin,116 a refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of authority that is
manifested in United States political ideology by a stress on individualism
whose development was unencumbered by the need to reject the historical
legacy of feudalism.ll7
The political form of this theological criticism is that, despite the Mormon
stress on the social community as the area within which aspirations to divine
perfection are realized,118 the j\'lormon people have not in fact realized the
ideal of a truly communitarian state or, in strictly Mormon terms, that the
ideals of the United Order of Enoch have not in fact been realized. It is this
form of the criticism that is met by "[t]he cornerstone of [Smith's] metaphysics,
[the] concept which pervaded the whole American spirit ... that man is
capable of eternal progress toward perfection."119 It is precisely the rejection
115. See note 7 supra.
116. .. 'Mormonism' claims an actual and literal relationship of parent and child between
the Creater and man - not in the figurative sense in which the engine may be called the
child of its builder; not the relationship of a thing mechanically made to the maker
thereof; but the connection between father and offspring. In short it is bold enough to
declare that man's spirit being the offspring of Deity, and man's body though of earthly
components yet being in the very image and likeness of God, man even in his present
degraded - aye, fallen condition - still possesses, if only in a latent state, inherited traits,
tendencies and powers that tell of his more than royal descent; and that these may be
de\'eloped so as to make him, e\'en while mortal, in a measure Godlike." J.E. TAL~IAGE,
ARTICLES OF FAITH 528 (4th ed. 1971). See also B. YOUNG, 3 JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 93 (1856):
"The Lord created you and me for the purpose of becoming Gods like Himself; when we
have been proved in our present capacity and have been faithful with all things He puts
into our possession. \Ve are created, we are born for the express purpose of growing up from
the low estate of manhood, to become Gods like unto our Father in heaven. That is the
truth about it, just as it is. The Lord has organized mankind for the express purpose of
increasing in that intelligence and truth, which is with God, until he is capable of creating
worlds on worlds, and becoming Gods, even the sons of God."
Il7. See gelleml/y L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
Il8. "Religion has too often spent a large proportion of its effort on doings apart
from the real business of life. One of man's problems is to establish a deep understanding
of man's relationship to his fellow men. W'hen that relationship is faulty, men are not
living in the just, helpful, and cooperative fellowship which the Savior enjoined. On every
hand we see an appalling human need awaiting the harness of religions power and zeal.
One of mankind's most insistent needs is the interpretation of religion in terms of
service.... Man's curious ability to keep divine relationships in one compartment of life
and human relationships in another is wrong. They belong together. . . . Religious life
should inspire practical goodness and daily usefulness. God dwells in the hearts of
the human family as well as in temples." H.B. BROWN, VISION AND VALOR 48-50.
119. See text accompanying note 47 supra. See also .I.E. TALMADGE, ARTICLES OF FAITH
529 (4th ed. 1971): .. 'Mormonism' claims that all nature, both on earth and in heaven.
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of this concept of human perfectibility that, in theological terms, permits
the charge of anthropomorphism to be lodged at the Mormon refusal to
define the Divine as that which is not human, just as, in political terms, it is
the acceptance of this concept that accounts for the Mormon refusal to define
as truly communitarian only that which is lacking in existing United States
society.
Insofar as both the theological and political non-Mormon visions of
man's destination are thus defined in terms of what human society is not, it
seems clear that, in a literary sense, insofar as human life is tragic or, in a
philosophical sense, to the extent that human life is existential, the objections
to Mormon theology are in fact objections to reality. More particularly in
terms of the definition of the entrepreneur with which we have been con-
cerned,120 what seems crucial is that Reynolds v. United States121 constituted
Mormon society a self-conscious minority122 in a "Christian"123 nation and
that what that minority teaches is that perfection, whether human124 or
operates on a plan of advancement; that the very Eternal Father is a progressive Being; that
his perfection while so complete as to be incomprehensible by man, possesses this esSential
quality of true perfection - the capacity of eternal increase. That therefore, in the far
future, beyond the horizon of eternities perchance, man may attain the status of a
God. Yet this does not mean that he shall be then the equal to the Deity we worship,
nor that he shall ever overtake those intelligences that are already beyond him in
advancement; for to assert such would be to argue that there is no progression beyond a
certain state of attainment, and that advancement is a characteristic of low organization
and inferior purpose alone." See BRIGHAM YOUNG, I JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 349 (1856):
"All organized existence is in progress to an endless advancement in eternal perfections,
or back to dissolution. . • . All things that have come within the bounds of man's
knowledge - the things he naturally understands - teach him that there is no period, in
all the eternities, where organized existence will become stationary, that it cannot advance
in knowledge, wisdom, power and glory."
120. See text accompanying notes 10-11, 53-54 supra.
121. 98 U.s. 145 (1878) (Constitutional "free exercise of religion" clause not accepted
as defense to a polygamy prosecution).
122. See note 120 supra.
123. "We are a religions people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We
guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. ',\Te make room for as wide a variety of
beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude
on the part of government that shows no partiality to anyone group and that lets each
flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the
state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting
the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For
it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to
their spiritual needs." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
124. "'Ve admit that God is the great source and fountain from whence proceeds all
good; that He is perfect intelligence, and that His wisdom is alone sufficient to govern and
regulate the mighty creations and worlds which shine and blaze with such magnificence
and splendor over our heads, as though touched with His finger and moved by His
Almighty word. And if so, it is done and regulated by law; for without law all must cer-
tainly fall into chaos. If, then, we admit that God is the source of all wisdom and
understanding, we must admit that by His direct inspiration He has taught man that
law is necessary in order to govern and regulate His own immediate interest and welfare:
for this reason, that law is beneficial to promote peace and happiness among men. And
as before remarked, God is the source from whence proceeds all good; and if man is
benefitted by law, then certainly law is good; and if law is good, then law, or the
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Divine,125 is itself a function of law.
CONCLUSION
This article has not argued that Mormonism is the only possible religion,
but that it embodies most precisely among Protestant beliefs the ideology
Weber designated as the Protestant Ethic. Within United States society in
general, the author has asserted that the social function necessitated by that
belief is performed by the law. "Whether the law can continue effectively to
perform that function in a global as opposed to a national economy is the
question left to the future.
principle of it eminated from God; for God is the source of all good; consequently, then,
he was the first Author of law, or the principle of it, to mankind:' J. SMITH, 2 DocmlENTARY
HISTORY OF THE CHURCH 12·13 (2d ed. 1960).
125. .. 'Mormonism' has taught me that God holds Himself accountable to law even
as He expects us to do. He has set us the example in obedience to law..• :' J.E. TALMADGE,
CONF. REPORT 96 (April 1930).
